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CRM 90-246 / February 1991

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The Use of Naval Forces in the Post-War Era: U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity, 1946-1990

Adam B. Siegel

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

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| | | | |
|---|--|---|---|
| 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave Blank) | | 2. REPORT DATE February 1991 | 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Final |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Use of Naval Forces in the Post-War Era: U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity, 1946 - 1990 | | | 5. FUNDING NUMBERS C - N00014-91-C-0002 PE - 65154N PR - R0148 |
| 6. AUTHOR(S) Adam B. Siegel | | | |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Center for Naval Analyses 4401 Ford Avenue Alexandria, Virginia 22302-0268 | | | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER CRM 90-246 |
| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) | | | 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER |
| 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES | | | |
| 12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Cleared for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited | | | 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE |
| 13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) Since the end of World War II, U.S. Naval forces have played a major role in at least 207 U.S. responses to international incidents and crises, exclusive of the Korean and Vietnam wars. This research memorandum summarizes these U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps crisis management operations. | | | |
| 14. SUBJECT TERMS Conflict, Crisis, Crisis management, Foreign policy, International incidents, International relations, Intervention, Marine Corps operations, Military assistance, Military strategy, Naval operations, Politico-military affairs, Western security (international) | | | 15. NUMBER OF PAGES 70 |
| | | | 16. PRICE CODE |
| 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT CPR | 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE CPR | 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT CPR | 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT SAR |

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298, (Rev. 2-89)
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1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded as a matter of possible interest. It describes U.S. Navy and Marine Corps involvement in 207 international crises since World War II.
2. During the 1970s, CNA sponsored a continuing effort to document Navy and Marine Corps involvement in U.S. responses to international crises. An effort to update this work was initiated in 1989. The interim results of the update were documented in CNA Research Memorandum 89-315, which was published in November 1989. This paper further updates the list of crises and provides additional information about Navy and Marine Corps involvement. For further information about this work, contact Adam Siegel (703) 824-2595.

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The Use of Naval Forces in the Post-War Era: U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity, 1946-1990

Adam B. Siegel

Operations and Support Division

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ABSTRACT

Since the end of World War II, U.S. Naval forces have played a major role in at least 207 U.S. responses to international incidents and crises, exclusive of the Korean and Vietnam wars. This research memorandum summarizes these U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps crisis management operations.

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INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II, U.S. Naval forces have played a major role in at least 207 U.S. responses to international incidents and crises, exclusive of the Korean and Vietnam wars. This research memorandum summarizes these U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps crisis management operations. It was written at the request of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. This paper is a report from CNA's History of U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity Project, conducted for the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06).

This paper focuses on the actions of the Navy and Marine Corps immediately prior to and during American responses to international incidents and crises. Because this paper focuses on Navy and Marine Corps involvement, the 207 crises include only those cases in which it is known that naval forces were involved in the response. The focus on the Navy and Marine Corps activity is not intended to obscure the fact that the other services and other instruments of policy (military and nonmilitary) play significant roles in the crisis management activities of the National Command Authorities. Similarly, the focus on crises should not obscure the day-to-day actions the Navy and Marine Corps undertake in support of U.S. foreign policy and national strategy, which range from the Navy's role in the strategic triad to the peacetime presence mission Navy and Marine Corps forces carry out worldwide.

This paper updates CNA Research Memorandum 89-315, *U.S. Navy Crisis Response Activity, 1946-1989: Preliminary Report*, which was distributed in November 1989.¹ Research Memorandum 89-315 documented 187 cases of U.S. Navy crisis response activity in the post-World War II era. The paper was revised to (a) more fully document U.S. Marine Corps activity, (b) include research completed after the original document, (c) improve methodological consistency between periods covered by different sources, and (d) add recent crisis response actions.

1. Substantial excerpts of Research Memorandum 89-315 were inserted into the *Congressional Record* by Senator John McCain on 9 November 1989 ("The Importance of Carriers in an Era of Changing Strategic Priorities," pages S15384-S15394).

DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES

This analysis of American military responses to international incidents and crises focuses on actions that fulfill the following criteria:

- Actions taken by the National Command Authorities involving the U.S. armed forces (for an action to be included in this paper, a Navy surface ship or a Marine Corps unit must have been involved).
- Actions taken in conjunction with events occurring outside the United States.
- Actions taken other than in the course of general war (Korea; 1950-1953; Vietnam, 1964-1975; and the conflict with Iraq from 17 January 1991).
- Actions that were reported at a given (senior) level in the political-military policy process.¹

A few categories of responses are not included. These include humanitarian missions, such as disaster relief and medical ship port calls, and intelligence operations that were excluded for security reasons.

Crisis management is a peacetime activity. Peace is defined negatively as the non-involvement of the United States in a war. War is defined in terms of U.S. casualties. Any engagement in which American forces suffer at least 1,000 casualties (KIA, WIA, and MIA) is at least a limited war. In the period reviewed, both the Korean and Vietnam-Indochina Wars fall into this category and are thus excluded from the analysis.²

The Korean War began with the invasion of the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950. The end of the war is defined as 27 July 1953 when the armistice agreement was signed at Panmunjom. The beginning of the Vietnam-Indochina War is set at 10 August 1964, the date the U.S. Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. The end of the war is defined as 31 December 1974. This date was selected so that (a) the long wind down of heavy U.S. involvement would not be unduly reflected in the study and (b) the evacuations of U.S. personnel from Phnom Penh and Saigon would be included.

This study focuses on international events. Thus, any actions undertaken by U.S. forces inside the United States (such as hurricane relief, fire-fighting, or support of police forces) are excluded. The exemptions clause above covers several categories of responses:

1. Each of these criteria can be discussed at great length. For most of CNA's research efforts on crisis response activity, a "senior" level has meant that the response had to be reported to the Chief of Naval Operations or to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the response to be counted.

2. The author completed the work on this research memorandum in late January 1991, while deployed to the Persian Gulf. At that time, the conflict with Iraq had not yet met this criteria. Clearly, however, the conflict with Iraq should be categorized as a war. This may force a reexamination of the methodological definition used for this study.

- Humanitarian operations: For example, the provision of medical assistance following natural disasters abroad.¹
- Intelligence and other special operations: These operations are not covered systematically in any source material available for this work, which does not include compartmentalized intelligence information. (A desire to produce an unclassified document drove the requirement for surface ship involvement for a USN crisis response to be included. Other forces such as submarines, patrol aircraft, and SEALs have been used without surface ship involvement; however, the activities of these forces are not well documented in the unclassified literature.)
- Operations that are routinely undertaken to support U.S. diplomacy: For example, U.S. Navy units are often alerted during Presidential visits overseas (such as during President Bush's February 1990 trip to Colombia).
- Law enforcement operations: For example, the Department of Defense involvement in drug interdiction operations.
- Incidents at sea: Activities that are not specifically related to events taking place ashore, such as incidents (collisions or harassment) between U.S. Navy and Soviet Navy vessels. Some types of incidents at sea, specifically terrorist hijackings or seizures of U.S. flag vessels that prompt a U.S. military response are included.

This paper relies heavily on previous work done in the field concerning the use of armed forces as a political instrument.² As such, each of the 207 crisis responses, listed in table 1, occur in one of three time periods:

- | | |
|--------------|--|
| 1985-present | Documentation of ongoing research at CNA on crisis response activity. Additional U.S. Navy and Marine Corps responses for the period might be documented in the course of the research. |
| 1955-1984 | Information for this period is based primarily on previous CNA research efforts (as documented in CNA Research Contributions 322 and 429 and CNA Research Memorandum 85-71). |
| 1946-1954 | Earlier CNA analysis in this area excluded this period. This paper relies principally on work done at The Brookings Institution (work done by Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan as documented in <i>Force Without War</i> , 1978) for this period. |

1. For examples of such activity, see CNA Information Manual 132, *A Sampling of U.S. Naval Humanitarian Operations*, by Adam B. Siegel, November 1990

2. The Selected Bibliography at the end of this document lists the main sources used to prepare this paper.

The Selected Bibliography lists other principal sources. The files maintained at the Marine Corps Historical Center and the Navy Operational Archives, both located in the Washington Navy Yard, were especially valuable.¹

Figure 1 shows the U.S. Navy's Ocean Area Codes, which are used to geographically describe each crisis response.




Figure 1. U.S. Navy Ocean Area Codes

1. Dan Crawford of the Marine Corps Historical Center and Wes Price (formerly) and Judy Short of the Navy Operational Archives deserve special appreciation for their assistance in this research.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

As with any attempt to record history, the very attempt creates a selective interpretation. Despite the best efforts of the researcher, attempts at description automatically create distortion to some degree.¹ The methodological choices made for this project both explicitly and implicitly tilt the historical record. The following paragraphs briefly examine some of the implications of these choices.

The focus on peacetime activity excludes from consideration three major episodes of U.S. military activity: the Korean War, the Vietnam Conflict, and the conflict with Iraq. If crisis response actions are viewed in isolation from these events, the periods 1951-1955 and 1966-1975 would seem to be periods of little U.S. military activity (see table 2). These periods encompass, however, wars excluded from consideration. The implication might be that, during war, military forces are not available for crisis response actions. The implication might also be that with a focus on wartime activity, crisis actions are not as prominently reported as during periods of relative tranquility.

The requirement for USN surface ship or USMC unit movement is also exclusionary. This leads to an understatement of total USN actions, as submarine, maritime patrol and transport aircraft, SEAL, and other activities are not necessarily dependent on surface ship movement. The requirement for movement excludes alerts. For the U.S. Army, especially, alerts are often used as a crisis response action and, depending on the circumstances, alerts can be used as a signal similar to that created by the movement of a surface ship. In addition, an attempt has been made to estimate equivalents to U.S. Navy ships for the size of involvement to be counted in this documentation (thus, small-scale involvement by other services might not be reflected in this document). These criteria lead to an understatement both in the total number of naval responses and of the role played by U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force forces in these crisis response actions.

The focus on USAF Strategic Air Command (SAC) and Tactical Air Command (TAC) combat aircraft highlights another important issue. Comparisons between types of forces may well be of greater interest than comparisons between services. Neither can be adequately done with this material at the present time. Due to the focus on Navy and Marine Corps activity, the research on Air Force and Army activity has been less extensive than desired. In the absence of such work, this research does not provide an adequate basis for comparisons of service-specific activity.

Humanitarian operations, a frequent tasking for all the services, are also excluded from this document. Just like political events, these can often be responded to as a "crisis." (In other words, natural disasters can be crises to which military forces might be ordered to respond.) Because this study focuses on activity that has at least a latent potential to lead to conflict, it does not include humanitarian operations. Although these operations are a mission that the military services are called on to perform, they are not the reason for

1. "If I am ordered: 'Record what you are now experiencing' I shall scarcely know how to obey this ambiguous order. Am I to report that I am writing; that I hear a bell ringing, a newsboy shouting, a loudspeaker droning, or am I to report, perhaps, that these noises irritate me?" [Karl R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, New York, Harper, 1959, p. 106, as quoted in CNA Professional Paper 279, *Causal Inferences and the Use of Force: A Critique of Force Without War*, by Stephen M. Walt, May 1980, p. 47]

which the forces were procured. The military services perform valuable humanitarian services, but this is a secondary benefit due to the existence of capabilities procured for other reasons.

In addition to the methodological biases discussed above, there are a number of other questions that, when systematically examined, would likely change the material presented in this paper. Each of the studies used to prepare this paper relied on slightly different methodologies and definitions of "crisis" and "crisis response." Because of these differences, the list presented here could change if the responses were further reviewed using a standard methodology and standard definitions.

Further, the question of when a crisis response begins and ends has not been systematically addressed. In many cases, either information is lacking or the division between regular operations and a contingency response is unclear. Thus, the information on the lengths of crises should be treated as approximate rather than specific. The unclear nature of begin and end dates also could easily lead to a renumbering of the crisis response actions. Many of the 207 documented crisis response actions could be logically separated into a number of cases, and other cases could be combined into one.¹ Such differences have been minimized as much as possible in light of the information available on each of the crisis response actions. Further research should remove some of the inconsistencies.

This document attempts solely to document the role U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps forces have played in crisis response actions since World War II; it does not attempt to answer qualitative questions that it might provoke. Such questions might include:

- How effective were the forces that responded in achieving the President's objective? Fundamentally, are military forces used to respond to crisis situations because they are effective or because the forces are available?
- Why were certain forces used? Which combination of forces is most effective in responses (and for what types of missions)?

While, to a certain extent, these questions will find no clear answers, they are too important to be left unexplored. In an attempt to answer this type of question, one should remain aware of the methodological biases and limitations of the material in this document as discussed above.

1. A comparison between the treatment of the USMC involvement in China, 1946-1949 (case 4), and in Lebanon, 1982-1984 (cases 162, 163, 167, and 172), highlights the difficulties in determining logical start and end dates for each response. In many ways, these could be viewed as relatively similar situations. The break points in U.S. Navy operations seemed clearer in the operations in and off Lebanon, and thus it is documented in four separate cases rather than the single case for the Marine involvement in China after the war.

Table 1. U.S. Naval Crisis Responses, 1946-1990

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|---------------------------|----------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
| 1 | Coup in Haiti | 1/12/46 | 2 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 2 | Security of Turkey | 3/22/46 | 19 | A6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 3 | Greece, Pol. Conflict | 4/10/46 | 5 | A6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 4 | China Civil War | Apr-46 | 1348 | P4 | Y | ? | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| 5 | Security of Trieste | 6/3/46 | 65 | A6 | Y | 0 | N | Y | | N | N |
| 6 | Turkey/Greece | 8/16/46 | 148 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 7 | Albania | Oct-46 | 46 | A6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 8 | Chilean Inauguration | 11/1/46 | 6 | P5 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 9 | Lebanon | 12/1/46 | 4 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 10 | Uruguayan Inauguration | 2/22/47 | 9 | A4 | Y | 0 | N | N | | Y | N |
| 11 | Greek Civil War | 4/16/47 | 412 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | Y |
| 12 | Security of Turkey | 5/2/47 | 396 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | N | | N | N |
| 13 | Cuban Sup. Anti-Truj. | 7/31/47 | 60 | A3 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 14 | Security of Trieste | 8/16/47 | 122 | A6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | Y |
| 15 | Elections in Italy | 11/2/47 | 94 | A6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 16 | Arab-Israeli War | 1/5/48 | 466 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 17 | Security of Trieste | 1/16/48 | 88 | A6 | Y | ? | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 18 | Interests in Persian Gulf | 1/20/48 | 1 | A7 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 19 | Security of Norway | 4/29/48 | 4 | A5 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 20 | Security of Berlin | 6/26/48 | 401 | A5 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| 21 | Relations w/Argentina | Nov-48 | 7 | A4 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 22 | Gov Change, China | 12/9/49 | 38 | P4 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 23 | Kor. War, For. Straits | 6/27/50 | 951 | P4 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 24 | Kor. War, Sec. Europe | 7/16/50 | 715 | A5 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| 25 | Lebanon | 8/14/50 | 1 | A6 | Y | 2 | N | N | | N | N |
| 26 | Security of Yugoslavia | 3/15/51 | 869 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 27 | China-Taiwan Conflict | 2/2/53 | 2 | P4 | Y | ? | N | N | | N | N |
| 28 | Dien Bien Phu | 3/13/54 | 90 | P4 | Y | 2 | N | N | Y | N | N |
| 29 | Honduras-Guatemala | 5/20/54 | 14 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 30 | PRC Shootdown | 7/24/54 | 6 | P4 | Y | 2 | N | N | | N | N |
| 31 | Vietnam Evacuations | Aug-54 | 305 | P4 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 32 | Honduran Elections | Oct-54 | 11 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 33 | Accord on Trieste | 10/7/54 | 20 | A6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | Y |
| 34 | Tachen Islands | 2/8/55 | 6 | P4 | Y | 6 | Y | Y | | Y | N |
| 35 | Red Sea Patrols | Feb-56 | 183 | A7 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 36 | Jordan | Mar-56 | 62 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 37 | Pre-Suez | Aug-56 | 69 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 38 | Suez War | 10/30/56 | 8 | A6 | Y | 3 | Y | Y | | Y | N |
| 39 | Port Lyautey | 11/29/56 | 57 | A5 | N | 0 | N | Y | | N | N |
| 40 | Post-Suez | 11/6/56 | 38 | A6 | Y | 8 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 41 | Cuban Civil War | Dec-56 | 435 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 42 | Red Sea Patrols | Feb-57 | 87 | A7 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |

NOTES: See page 12.

Table 1. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|-----------------------|----------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
| 43 | Jordan Unrest | 4/25/57 | 9 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 44 | Haiti | 6/14/57 | 18 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | Y | N | N |
| 45 | PRC-ROC Tension | Jul-57 | 63 | P4 | Y | 3 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 46 | Syria | 8/21/57 | 118 | A6 | Y | 4 | Y | Y | Y | Y | N |
| 47 | Indonesia | 12/10/57 | 174 | P4 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | Y | N | N |
| 48 | Venezuelan Revolution | 1/21/58 | 2 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 49 | Venezuela | 5/13/58 | 3 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | Y |
| 50 | Lebanon | 5/15/58 | 48 | A6 | Y | 3 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 51 | Lebanon | Jul-58 | 93 | A6 | Y | 3 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| 52 | Jordan-Iraq | 7/17/58 | 138 | A7 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 53 | Quemoy | Aug-58 | 67 | P4 | Y | 6 | Y | Y | | Y | N |
| 54 | Panama | 4/30/59 | 5 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 55 | Berlin Crisis | May-59 | 145 | A5 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| 56 | Laos | Jul-59 | 103 | P4 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| 57 | PRC-ROC | 7/5/59 | 6 | P4 | Y | 2 | ? | N | | N | N |
| 58 | Panama | Aug-59 | 93 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 59 | Congo | 7/1/60 | 124 | A4 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| 60 | Guatemala | 11/14/60 | 27 | A3 | Y | 2 | N | N | | N | N |
| 61 | Laos | 1/1/61 | 6 | P4 | Y | 3 | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| 62 | SS Santa Maria | 1/23/61 | 8 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 63 | Gulf of Guinea-Congo | 2/2/61 | 34 | A4 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 64 | Laos | 3/21/61 | 85 | P4 | Y | 3 | Y | Y | Y | N | N |
| 65 | SS Western Union | 3/31/61 | 1 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 66 | Bay of Pigs | Apr-61 | 62 | A3 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | Y | N |
| 67 | Dominican Republic | 5/30/61 | 12 | A3 | Y | 3 | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| 68 | Zanzibar | Jun-61 | 31 | P6 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 69 | Kuwait | 7/4/61 | 4 | P6 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 70 | Berlin Crisis | Jul-61 | 102 | A5 | Y | 3 | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| 71 | Dominican Republic | 11/18/61 | 32 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 72 | South Vietnam | Dec-61 | 244 | P4 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | Y |
| 73 | Dominican Republic | 1/18/62 | 2 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 74 | Guatemala Riots | 3/14/62 | 9 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 75 | South Vietnam | 4/15/62 | 849 | P4 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 76 | Thailand | 5/10/62 | 90 | P4 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 77 | Guantanamo | 7/25/62 | 3 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 78 | Haiti Civil Disorder | Aug-62 | 14 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 79 | Yemen | Sep-62 | 213 | A7 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 80 | Cuban Missile Crisis | 10/14/62 | 38 | A3 | Y | 8 | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| 81 | Sino-Indian War | 11/19/62 | 2 | P6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 82 | SS Anzoatequi | 2/12/63 | 9 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 83 | Laos | Apr-63 | 35 | P4 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 84 | Haitian Unrest | 4/29/63 | 34 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |

NOTES: See page 12.

Table 1. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|-------------------------|----------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
| 85 | Haiti Civil War | 8/6/63 | 17 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 86 | Vietnam Civil Disorder | 8/25/63 | 93 | P4 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 87 | PRC-ROC | 9/20/63 | 5 | P4 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 88 | Dominican Republic | 9/25/63 | 81 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 89 | Indonesia-Malaysia | Oct-63 | 78 | P4 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 90 | Zanzibar | 1/12/64 | 2 | P6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 91 | Tanganyika | 1/20/64 | 7 | P6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 92 | Carib. Surveillance | 1/15/64 | 92 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 93 | Panama | Jan-64 | 101 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| 94 | Venezuela | Jan-64 | 310 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 95 | Cyprus | 1/22/64 | 269 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 96 | Brazil | 3/31/64 | 4 | A4 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 97 | Laos | 4/21/64 | 42 | P4 | Y | 2 | N | Y | | N | N |
| 98 | Guantanamo | 5/1/64 | 7 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 99 | Panama | 5/7/64 | 14 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 100 | Dominican Republic | 7/24/64 | 5 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 101 | Gulf of Tonkin | 8/2/64 | 9 | P4 | Y | 2 | N | N | | N | N |
| 102 | Haiti | 8/7/64 | 3 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 103 | Panama | 1/7/65 | 6 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | N | | N | N |
| 104 | Tanzania | 1/17/65 | 1 | P6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 105 | Venezuela-Colombia | Jan-65 | 91 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 106 | British Guiana | Apr-65 | 11 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 107 | Dominican Republic | 4/24/65 | 515 | A3 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| 108 | Yemen | Jul-65 | 32 | P6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 109 | Cyprus | 8/3/65 | 30 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 110 | Indo-Pakistani War | 9/11/65 | 25 | P6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 111 | Indonesia | 10/2/65 | 8 | P4 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 112 | Greek Coup | 4/21/67 | 23 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 113 | Six Day War | 6/6/67 | 6 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| 114 | DD <i>Eilat</i> Sinking | 10/21/67 | 12 | A6 | Y | 2 | N | N | | N | N |
| 115 | Cyprus | 11/15/67 | 24 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 116 | USS <i>Pueblo</i> | 1/24/68 | 59 | P4 | Y | 3 | N | N | | Y | N |
| 117 | EC-121 Shootdown | 4/14/69 | 26 | P4 | Y | 4 | N | N | | Y | Y |
| 118 | Curacao Civil Unrest | 5/31/69 | 1 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 119 | Lebanon-Libya Ops | 10/26/69 | 5 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 120 | Trinidad | 4/22/70 | 6 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | Y | N |
| 121 | Jordan | 6/11/70 | 7 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | Y | Y | N |
| 122 | Jordan | 9/2/70 | 60 | A6 | Y | 3 | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| 123 | Haiti Succession | 4/22/71 | 37 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | Y | | N | N |
| 124 | Indo-Pakistani War | 12/10/71 | 30 | P6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 125 | Bahama Lines | 12/15/71 | 52 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 126 | Lebanon | 5/3/73 | 7 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |

NOTES: See page 12.

Table 1. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|-----------------------|----------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
| 127 | Middle East War | 10/6/73 | 48 | A6 | Y | 3 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| 128 | Middle East Force | 10/24/73 | 22 | A7 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 129 | Oil Embargo-IO Ops | 10/25/73 | 159 | P6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 130 | Cyprus | 7/15/74 | 39 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| 131 | Cyprus Unrest | 1/18/75 | 4 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 132 | Ethiopia | 2/3/75 | 4 | A7 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 133 | Eagle Pull, Cambodia | Feb-75 | 70 | P4 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| 134 | Frequent Wind, Viet. | 4/18/75 | 12 | P4 | Y | 4 | Y | Y | Y | Y | N |
| 135 | Mayaguez | 5/13/75 | 3 | P4 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | Y | N |
| 136 | Lebanon | Aug-75 | 367 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 137 | Polisario Rebels | 1/5/76 | 18 | A5 | Y | 0 | Y | N | | N | N |
| 138 | Tunisia | 7/27/76 | 25 | A6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 139 | Kenya-Uganda | 7/8/76 | 20 | P6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 140 | Korean Tree Incident | 8/19/76 | 21 | P4 | Y | 1 | N | N | Y | Y | Y |
| 141 | Uganda | 2/25/77 | 6 | P6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 142 | Ogaden War | Feb-78 | 51 | P6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | Y | N |
| 143 | Sea of Okhotsk | 6/15/78 | 10 | P4 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 144 | Afghanistan | Jul-78 | 31 | P6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 145 | Nicaragua | 9/16/78 | 16 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | Y | N |
| 146 | Iranian Revolution | 12/6/78 | 86 | P6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | Y | N |
| 147 | China-Vietnam | 2/25/79 | 6 | P4 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 148 | Yemen | 3/6/79 | 93 | P6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | Y | N |
| 149 | Nicaraguan Revolution | Jul-79 | 31 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 150 | Soviet Troops in Cuba | 10/2/79 | 46 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | Y | N |
| 151 | Afghan/Iran Hostages | 10/9/79 | 472 | P6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| 152 | Park-Chung Hee | 10/26/79 | 9 | P4 | Y | 1 | N | N | | Y | Y |
| 153 | Korea | 5/27/80 | 33 | P4 | Y | 1 | N | N | Y | Y | Y |
| 154 | Iran-Iraq War | 9/30/80 | 125 | P6 | Y | 2 | N | N | Y | N | N |
| 155 | Poland | 12/9/80 | 24 | A5 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 156 | Morocco | 1/29/81 | 10 | A5 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 157 | Liberia | 4/1/81 | 15 | A5 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | Y |
| 158 | Syria | 5/3/81 | 135 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | Y | N | N |
| 159 | Libya | 8/1/81 | 20 | A6 | Y | 2 | N | N | Y | N | N |
| 160 | Sadat-Sudan | 10/7/81 | 24 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | Y | Y | N |
| 161 | Central America | 10/16/81 | 47 | A3 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 162 | Israeli Invasion | 6/8/82 | 45 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 163 | Peacekeeping Force | 8/10/82 | 30 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 164 | Palestinian Massacre | 9/22/82 | 143 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 165 | Libya-Sudan | 2/14/83 | 11 | A6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 166 | Honduras | 6/14/83 | 131 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | Y |
| 167 | Libya-Chad | 8/1/83 | 16 | A6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | Y | N |
| 168 | Marine Barracks Bomb | 8/29/83 | 170 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | Y | N |

NOTES: See page 12.

Table 1. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|--------------------------|----------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
| 169 | KAL 007 | 9/1/83 | 66 | P4 | Y | 0 | N | N | | Y | N |
| 170 | Iran-Iraq | 10/8/83 | 92 | P6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 171 | Korea-Burma | 10/11/83 | 3 | P4 | Y | 1 | N | N | | Y | N |
| 172 | Grenada | 10/20/83 | 23 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| 173 | Syria | 12/3/83 | 37 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 174 | Central America | 3/13/84 | 264 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| 175 | Persian Gulf | Apr-84 | 245 | A7 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 176 | Red Sea Mines | 8/3/84 | 46 | A7 | Y | 0 | Y | N | | N | N |
| 177 | Beirut Embassy | 9/21/84 | 42 | A6 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 178 | Saudi Hijacking | 11/6/84 | 1 | A6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 179 | Cuba | 11/30/84 | 1 | A3 | Y | 1 | N | N | | Y | N |
| 180 | U.S. Pers. in Lebanon | Mar-85 | 32 | A6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 181 | TWA 847 Hijacking | 6/14/85 | 41 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 182 | Persian Gulf | 9/13/85 | 19 | A7 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 183 | Achille Lauro | 10/7/85 | 4 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 184 | Egypt Air Hijacking | 11/23/85 | 3 | A6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 185 | Persian Gulf Escort | 1/12/86 | 141 | A7 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 186 | Yemen Civil War | Jan-86 | 32 | P6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 187 | OVL-FON Ops | Feb-86 | 85 | A6 | Y | 3 | N | N | Y | N | N |
| 188 | Lebanon Hostages | Mar-86 | 1 | A6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 189 | La Belle Disco, Libya | 4/10/86 | 6 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | Y | Y | N |
| 190 | Pakistan Hijacking | Sep-86 | 1 | A6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 191 | Persian Gulf Ops | Jan-87 | 579 | A7 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | Y |
| 192 | Hostages in Lebanon | Feb-87 | 29 | A6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 193 | Haiti | Jan-88 | 31 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 194 | Panama | Apr-88 | 30 | A3 | N | 0 | N | Y | | N | N |
| 195 | Summer Olympics | Sep-88 | 31 | P4 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| 196 | Burma Unrest | Sep-88 | 31 | P6 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 197 | Maldives Coup | 11/17/88 | 1 | P6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 198 | Lebanon Civil War | Feb-89 | 45 | A6 | Y | Y | Y | Y | | N | Y |
| 199 | Panama Elections | 5/11/89 | 52 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| 200 | China Civil Unrest | Jun-89 | 31 | P4 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| 201 | Hostages in Lebanon | 8/1/89 | 32 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 202 | Philippines | 11/30/89 | 6 | P4 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | Y | N |
| 203 | Panama | 12/20/89 | 34 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | Y | | Y | Y |
| 204 | Liberia NEO | 5/25/90 | 169 | A5 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| 205 | Iraqi Pressure on Kuwait | 7/24/90 | 9 | A7 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| 206 | Operation Desert Shield | 8/2/90 | 166 | A7 | Y | 6 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| 207 | Somalia Evacuation | 1/2/91 | 9 | P6 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | Y | N |

NOTES: See page 12.

Table 1 (Continued)

Column headings:

- B-date:** Date of the first known movement of U.S. Navy surface forces in response to a crisis. In some cases (primarily in the 1946-1954 period from the Brookings *Force Without War* database), the begin date is for the first use of U.S. armed forces in the response. When the date is given in the form "Mon-Yr" rather than "M/D/Yr," it is because a specific starting date of operations is not known.
- Length:** In days, from "Begin date" to known (or the best estimate of the) release date of forces to normal operations. In some cases, the approximate date that operations became institutionalized (e.g., a normal part of U.S. Navy operations) was used as the end of the crisis response.
- OAC:** U.S. Navy Ocean Area Code, as shown in figure 1. This is the location of the crisis or of the main portion of the crisis response.
- USN:** Are U.S. Navy surface ships (of any class) known to have been involved in the crisis response?
- CVs:** Largest number of carriers known to be operating in the crisis response at any one point. (Both CVAs and CVSs are counted in this column.) A "?" indicates that carrier involvement is assumed but that the exact number of vessel(s) is not known.
- Amp:** Are amphibious ships known to have been involved in the crisis response? A "?" indicates that amphibious ship involvement is assumed but that exact vessel(s) are not known.
- USMC:** Are U.S. Marine Corps forces (other than aviation units operating off aircraft carriers) known to have been involved in the crisis response?
- VM on CV:** Are U.S. Marine Corps aviation units, of any type, known to have been operating off one (or more) of the aircraft carriers involved in the crisis response? (See the appendix for a listing of USMC deployments aboard aircraft carriers for the 1949-1989 period.)
- SAC/TAC:** Are U.S. Air Force strategic or tactical fighters and/or bomber forces known to have been involved in the crisis response? (This column relies heavily on the Brookings (and Zelikow) *Force Without War* data for the 1946-1982 period. If "USAF combat aircraft" was indicated in the *Force Without War* database, a "Y" has been entered. In a number of cases, available information indicates SAC/TAC involvement even when the Brookings data do not indicate such involvement. For such cases, a "Y" was entered.)
- USA:** Are U.S. Army forces known to have been involved in the crisis response? (This column relies heavily on the Brookings (and Zelikow) *Force Without War* database for the 1946-1982 period. If "USA" involvement is indicated in the Brookings database, a "Y" has been entered. In a number of cases, available information indicates USA involvement even when the Brookings data do not indicate such involvement. In those cases, a "Y" was entered.)

SOURCES: See Selected Bibliography.

U.S. NAVAL AND OTHER SERVICE CRISIS RESPONSE ACTIVITY

In the 207 documented instances of U.S. Naval crisis response activity since World War II, aircraft carriers have played a dominant role. In 140 cases, or 68 percent of the total, aircraft carriers were used at some point in the response (see tables 2 and 3). Amphibious ships were frequently used as well (112 cases, 54 percent). Not surprisingly, the Marine Corps involvement (other than aviation units deployed aboard aircraft carriers) in these 207 crisis responses closely paralleled the use of amphibious ships (113 cases, 55 percent). Frequently, U.S. Marine Corps aviation units are deployed aboard aircraft carriers. (See the appendix.) Therefore, it should not be surprising that in at least 21 cases, or somewhat less than one-sixth of the aircraft carrier cases, USMC aviators were deployed aboard a carrier that responded to a crisis situation. In six of these cases, there was no other USMC involvement. Thus, USMC forces of all types were involved in at least 119 (57 percent) of the listed responses.

Table 2. U.S. Naval Crisis Response Activity, 1946-1990, by Five-Year Periods^a

| Period | Number of Responses | USN | CVs | Avg. Number of CVs | Amph. Ships | USMC | VM on CVs | TAC/SAC | USA |
|--------|---------------------|-----|-----|--------------------|-------------|------|-----------|---------|-----|
| 46-50 | 25 | 25 | 19 | 1.1 | 9 | 9 | 0 | 4 | 5 |
| 51-55 | 9 | 9 | 6 | 2.5 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 56-60 | 26 | 25 | 17 | 2.8 | 19 | 19 | 3 | 7 | 5 |
| 61-65 | 51 | 51 | 23 | 1.8 | 29 | 29 | 5 | 7 | 7 |
| 66-70 | 11 | 11 | 9 | 2.1 | 8 | 8 | 2 | 6 | 3 |
| 71-75 | 14 | 14 | 10 | 1.8 | 9 | 10 | 1 | 4 | 3 |
| 76-80 | 19 | 19 | 15 | 1.1 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 9 | 4 |
| 81-85 | 29 | 29 | 23 | 1.3 | 16 | 15 | 3 | 8 | 4 |
| 86-90 | 23 | 22 | 18 | 1.4 | 12 | 14 | 2 | 7 | 6 |
| Total | 207 | 205 | 140 | 1.7 | 112 | 113 | 21 | 53 | 38 |

a. This table shows the number of cases for each category by five-year periods. One response from 1991 is added to the 86-90 figures. The "CVs" and "Amph. Ships" columns include those cases in which there were "?" in the "CVs" and "Am" columns in table 1. The "Avg. Number of CVs" column is the average number of carriers used in responses for each period. The average does not include the "?" cases.

Although Navy and Marine forces typically operated independently, in 53 of the crises (26 percent) USAF SAC/TAC fighters and/or bombers were also involved, and in 38 crisis actions (18 percent) Army forces were involved. Although the information on USAF and USA involvement relies almost entirely on secondary sources, the distributions are generally consistent with those found in the research done at Brookings in the mid-1970s and in a follow-on effort conducted in the early 1980s.¹

1. Barry Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War*, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1978; and, Philip D. Zelikow, "Force Without War, 1975-1982," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 7, no. 1, March 1984, pp. 29-54.

Table 3. U.S. Naval Crisis Response Activity, 1946-1990; Proportion of Involvement by Service and Force Type

| Period | Number of Responses | Proportion of Involvement | | | | | |
|--------|---------------------|---------------------------|------|------|----------|------|-----|
| | | CVs | Amph | USMC | VM on CV | USAF | USA |
| 46-50 | 25 | .76 | .36 | .36 | .00 | .16 | .20 |
| 51-55 | 9 | .66 | .56 | .56 | .11 | .11 | .11 |
| 56-60 | 26 | .65 | .73 | .73 | .12 | .27 | .14 |
| 61-65 | 51 | .45 | .57 | .57 | .10 | .14 | .14 |
| 66-70 | 11 | .82 | .73 | .73 | .18 | .55 | .27 |
| 71-75 | 14 | .71 | .64 | .71 | .07 | .29 | .21 |
| 76-80 | 19 | .79 | .26 | .21 | .21 | .47 | .21 |
| 81-85 | 29 | .79 | .55 | .52 | .10 | .28 | .14 |
| 86-91 | 23 | .78 | .52 | .61 | .09 | .30 | .26 |
| <hr/> | | | | | | | |
| Total | 207 | .59 | .53 | .54 | .10 | .26 | .18 |

NOTE: This table is derived from the data in table 2.

For the period 1946-1982, according to the Brookings research, there were 258 uses of the U.S. armed forces for political purposes. Of these 258 cases, "ground combat forces" were involved in 55 (or 21 percent). In the 209 cases involving U.S. Navy forces,¹ ground combat forces were involved in 36 (or 17 percent--see table 4). According to this research, "land-based air" was used in 125 responses, or 48 percent of the total. In those 209 cases of Navy involvement, "land-based air" was also involved in 81 of the cases (39 percent). This Brookings figure includes all forms of land-based aircraft, USAF bombers, fighters, surveillance aircraft, tankers, and transports, as well as U.S. Navy patrol and transport aircraft. There is no comparable figure in this work.

1. There are two principal reasons for the apparent discrepancy between the numbers presented in this paper (207 naval responses for the years 1946-1990) and the *Force Without War* data (209 naval responses for the 1946-1982 period):

- Differing definitions for the duration of the Vietnam War (CNA's research defines the start of the Vietnam War with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of August 1964 and the end of the war as 31 December 1974, following the end of significant U.S. involvement in the war effort. The respective dates in the Brookings work are March 1965 and March 1972).
- Multiple listings for some crises in the Brookings research to facilitate examination of different forms of use of America's armed forces for political purposes.

The Brookings study also focused more on the political utility of armed force as opposed to CNA's focus upon the use of U.S. Navy forces to respond to an international incident or crisis. Therefore, a number of cases included in the Brookings database (such as the invitation to Spanish observers to ride U.S. Navy ships during an exercise in 1952 following the signing of the basing agreement between the United States and Spain) are excluded according to the definitions used at CNA.

This document does not examine all instances of the American use of force in situations short of war and thus cannot describe the share of total responses by the U.S. armed forces that the Navy participated in. In the Brookings, and follow-on work, however, there were 258 uses of the U.S. armed forces for political purposes examined for service involvement for the period 1946-1982. According to the Brookings research, naval forces participated in 209, or 81 percent, of the total number. Note, however, that the Brookings use of the term "naval" differs from the one typically used. In the Brookings definition, naval refers to actions from the sea, essentially. Thus, Navy activity by land-based patrol aircraft (such as ASW aircraft like the P-3) was included under land-based air, and Marine Corps activity when not deployed aboard Navy vessels was considered either land-based air or ground forces (depending on the unit involved). Thus, the 209 figure (81 percent) should be considered a lower bound estimate on total U.S. Naval force involvement in these actions.

Table 4. Distribution of Incidents by Type of Force Responding, 1946-1982

| Type of Force Used | Number of Incidents | Percentage of Total |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|
| Naval only | 119 | 46 |
| Naval and land-based air | 54 | 21 |
| Naval and ground | 9 | 3 |
| All three components | 27 | 10 |
| Ground only | 5 | 2 |
| Ground and air | 14 | 5 |
| Land-based air only | 30 | 12 |
| <hr/> | | |
| Total Incidents | 258 | 100 |
| <hr/> | | |
| Total for naval forces ^a | 209 | 81 |
| Total for land-based Air ^b | 125 | 48 |
| Total for ground combat forces ^c | 55 | 21 |

a. Includes Marine Corps units when deployed on amphibious vessels.

b. In addition to USAF forces, this includes Navy land-based maritime patrol aircraft, Marine Corps fixed-wing aviation (when not deployed aboard aircraft carriers), and Army helicopter transportation units.

c. Army units, and Marines when not deployed on amphibious vessels.

SOURCES: Barry Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War*, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1978, p. 40 (for the 1946-1975 period); and, Philip D. Zelikow, "Force Without War, 1975-1982," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 7, no. 1, March 1984, pp. 46-47 (for the 1975-1982 period).

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. NAVAL CRISIS RESPONSE ACTIVITY

Over the past 45 years, the Navy and Marine Corps have been called on to respond to international incidents and crises in every region of the world. The Mediterranean Sea has been the scene of the most crisis responses of any one region (61 responses, 29 percent of the total). (See table 5.) There have been at least 52 responses (25 percent) in the Caribbean, 40 (19 percent) in the Western Pacific, and 23 (11 percent) in the Indian Ocean. The Mediterranean has been one of the most active regions, in terms of the number of crisis responses, in every period except during the Kennedy and early Johnson Administrations (1961-65) and during the Carter Administration (1976-80). In the 1961-65 period, there were 25 responses in the Caribbean (following the Cuban revolution) and 12 in the Western Pacific (in the years leading to heavy U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War). In the same period, there were just two responses in the Mediterranean. During the 1976-80 period, the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific saw the most responses (8 and 5 respectively) with just one response in the Mediterranean.

Table 5. U.S. Naval Crisis Response Activity, 1946-1990; Regional Distribution^a

| Period | A3 | A4/P5 | A5 | A6 | A7 | P4 | P6 | Total |
|------------|----|-------|----|----|----|----|----|-------|
| 46-50 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 13 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 25 |
| 51-55 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 9 |
| 56-60 | 7 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 3 | 5 | 0 | 26 |
| 61-65 | 25 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 12 | 8 | 51 |
| 66-70 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 11 |
| 71-75 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 14 |
| 76-80 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 8 | 19 |
| 81-85 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 16 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 29 |
| 86-90 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 23 |
| | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total | 52 | 6 | 11 | 61 | 14 | 40 | 23 | 207 |
| Percentage | 25 | 3 | 5 | 29 | 7 | 19 | 11 | 100 |

- a. A3 = Caribbean A4/P5 = S. Atlantic and SE Pacific
 A5 = Eastern Atlantic A6 = Mediterranean Sea
 A7 = Red Sea and Persian Gulf
 P4 = Western Pacific P6 = Indian Ocean

Figure 1 displays the U.S. Navy Ocean Area Codes on a world map.

Table 6 briefly describes each of the 207 Navy crisis response actions, highlighting the cause and nature of each response. A glossary of abbreviations and acronyms is provided at the end of this document.

Table 6. Descriptions of U.S. Naval Crisis Response Actions, 1946-1990

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|---|---------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
| 1 | Coup in Haiti | 1/12/46 | 2 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| | On 10 January 1946, a military junta overthrew the government of President Elie Lescot in Haiti. USN forces in the Caribbean moved toward Honduras but were soon recalled as the situation quickly stabilized. | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | Security of Turkey | 3/22/46 | 19 | A6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| | Amidst Soviet pressure on Turkey and tension over the Soviet presence in Iran, the U.S. Government decided to use the battleship <i>Missouri</i> to return the body of the deceased Turkish ambassador to the United States to Turkey for burial. <i>Missouri</i> , which departed the United States on 22 March, arrived in Istanbul on 5 April. This was taken as a strong sign of U.S. support for and commitment to Turkey. | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3 | Greece, Pol. Conflict | 4/10/46 | 5 | A6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| | On 10 April 1946, following her visit in Istanbul, USS <i>Missouri</i> entered Piraeus harbor. This was during a period of significant Eastern Bloc pressure on Greece and was meant to signal U.S. resolve to support the Greek Government. | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4 | China Civil War | Apr-46 | 1348 | P4 | Y | ? | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| | On 9 January 1946, Communist and government troop movements were suspended in accordance with a truce agreement. In April, the truce collapsed as Communist forces attacked Nationalist-held towns and all-out conflict renewed. Following the breakdown of the truce in China, the U.S. Navy resumed transporting Nationalist troops within the country. Over the next few years, significant U.S. force movements occurred within China. Marines had first entered China in September 1945 to accept the surrender of Japanese forces. Marines remained in China or in Chinese waters until December 1949 and frequently responded to the events ongoing within the country. For example, in November 1948, 1,250 Marines from Guam reinforced the USMC garrison at Tsingtao, and in mid-December, a contingent of Marines moved from Tsingtao to Shanghai to protect the 2,500 U.S. nationals in the city. | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5 | Security of Trieste | 6/3/46 | 65 | A6 | Y | 0 | N | Y | | N | N |

On 2 June 1946, the Governments of the United States and United Kingdom formally protested Yugoslavian obstruction of the Allied Military Government in Trieste. The next day, the U.S. Navy confirmed that the cruiser *Fargo* was en route to Trieste. In late June, as many as ten Allied warships, including USN and Royal Navy (RN) battleships, lay off the coast. In July, *Fargo* made the first port visit to Trieste by a major U.S. combatant since the end of hostilities. An Adriatic patrol, consisting of either a cruiser or two destroyers, began in July.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|--|----------------------|---------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
| 6 | Turkey/Greece | 8/16/46 | 148 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| <p>On 7 August 1946, following Turkish elections, the Soviet Union renewed its demands for a revision of the Montreaux Convention governing access to the Black Sea, and Soviet naval activity in the region began. On 10 August, the Turkish Premier reaffirmed Turkey's intent to continue opposition to the Soviet demands. In the coming months, U.S. and U.K. naval activity in region greatly increased, and on 18 October, Turkey rejected the Soviet demands. In the same time period, the Communist insurgency in Greece grew dramatically. On 5 September, CVB <i>Franklin Delano Roosevelt</i> and four escorts arrived in Piraeus to underscore the U.S. support for the Greek Government. On 9 September, as <i>Roosevelt</i> left port, 78 U.S. aircraft flew over the task force. On 30 September, the U.S. Government announced that U.S. Navy units would be permanently stationed in the Mediterranean to carry out American policy and diplomacy.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | Albania | Oct-46 | 46 | A6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| <p>Through the fall of 1946, the relations between the pro-Soviet Albanian government and Western nations grew increasingly hostile. A number of American merchant vessels struck mines in the waters off Albania, prompting contingency planning for mine-sweeping operations. Two RN destroyers struck mines on 22 October 1946, leading to greater tension. On 14 November, the State Department personnel assigned to Albania were evacuated by a tug to two USN destroyers, which stood off just outside the three-mile territorial limit.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 8 | Chilean Inauguration | 11/1/46 | 6 | P5 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| <p>Following a leftist victory in the September election and a month of tensions over the results, the United States announced that a five-ship squadron would visit Chile for the inauguration. The USN ships arrived on 1 November.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 9 | Lebanon | 12/1/46 | 4 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| <p>Just before the withdrawal of the last French troops from Lebanon (which occurred in late December), elements of the U.S. Mediterranean Fleet (including an aircraft carrier and amphibious forces with an embarked USMC BLT) made a well-publicized port visit in Beirut.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 10 | Uruguayan Inaug. | 2/22/47 | 9 | A4 | Y | 0 | N | N | | Y | N |
| <p>To emphasize U.S. support for the new Uruguayan Government, a Navy and Army Air contingent was sent to Montevideo for the 1 March 1947 inauguration. On 23 February, seven B-29 Superfortresses representing the Army left Salina, Kansas. The Navy contingent consisted of the light cruiser <i>Fresno</i> and four destroyers.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 11 | Greek Civil War | 4/16/47 | 412 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | Y |
| <p>On 30 January 1947, the Government of Greece declared martial law amidst the worsening conflict with the Communist insurgents. On 21 February, the United Kingdom announced that it could no longer afford to give military aid to Greece and Turkey. Amidst the debate in the U.S. Congress over an aid package to the two countries, elements of the U.S. Navy's Mediterranean Fleet, including the carrier <i>Leyte</i>, visited Greek ports. Through this period, one to two ships from the Sixth Task Fleet were kept in Greek waters.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|--------------------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 12 | Security of Turkey | 5/2/47 | 396 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | N | | N | N |
|----|--------------------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Amidst a significant reduction in the U.K. Eastern Mediterranean presence and continued pressure from the USSR on Turkey, the U.S. Government offered a large aid package to Turkey. In what was seen as linked to the aid package issue, four USN ships (including the aircraft carrier *Leyte*) made a week-long port visit in Istanbul.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 13 | Cuban Sup, Anti-Truj | 7/31/47 | 60 | A3 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
|----|----------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

The Cuban Government began supporting anti-Trujillo forces as early as January 1946. In July 1947, the Trujillo regime began to perceive the exiles as a major threat. On 31 July, U.S. Navy ships began search operations to intercept Dominican exiles' craft, and on 18 August, the Dominican Republic's armed forces were put on alert. Following this, USN operations in the Caribbean further increased as part of growing U.S. pressure on Cuba. On 28 September, the revolutionary forces were disbanded by Cuba.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---------------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 14 | Security of Trieste | 8/16/47 | 122 | A6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | Y |
|----|---------------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In August 1947, there was evidence of progress on the questions surrounding the division of Trieste. On 3 September, an accord for withdrawal from Trieste was signed; 5,000 U.S. troops along with equal contingents of British and Yugoslav soldiers were to remain, and the city was divided into two zones. Despite the agreement, tension continued as Yugoslavia tested the Anglo-U.S. commitment. For example, on 16 September, 12 U.S. Army troops, who were soon reinforced, blocked the movement of 2,000 Yugoslavian troops into the western zone of the city. Throughout this period, a combatant from the Sixth Task Fleet was stationed off Trieste.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|--------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 15 | Elections in Italy | 11/2/47 | 94 | A6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
|----|--------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Amidst growing fears of a Communist victory and increasing domestic violence, the United States announced a delay to late November of the departure of the last occupation troops in Italy. USN ships were moved to the area and made port calls in cities along both coasts as the troops remained through mid-December following President Truman's 12 December pledge that the United States would defend Italy despite the withdrawal of the last 1,600 troops.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|------------------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 16 | Arab-Israeli War | 1/5/48 | 466 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|------------------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In early January 1948, the Sixth Fleet began patrol operations in the Eastern Mediterranean as the situation in Palestine deteriorated toward the end of the British Mandate period. On 15 May, Israel declared its independence and Arab forces invaded. On 18 June, following the death of the U.S. Consul General by sniper fire, a Marine force was detached from the USS *Kearsage*, then in Tripoli Harbor, to Jerusalem. The Chief of Naval Operations assigned three destroyers to the U.N. mediator for the Palestinian truce the next day. On 23 July, USS *Putnam* evacuated the U.N. team from Haifa and became the first USN ship to fly the U.N. flag.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 17 | Security of Trieste | 1/16/48 | 88 | A6 | Y | ? | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|---------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Yugoslav Communist labor unions called for a general strike in Trieste in the first weeks of January 1949. Shortly thereafter, 1,000 Marines of the 2nd USMC division left for the Mediterranean one day ahead of schedule. This was perceived as a warning for Yugoslav troops not to molest U.S. Army troops in Trieste. The departure of the Marines being replaced was postponed, thereby doubling the USMC presence in the Mediterranean for a period.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---------------------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 18 | Interests in Persian Gulf | 1/20/48 | 1 | A7 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|----|---------------------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

To underscore the U.S. commitment to the Persian Gulf region, the USN Persian Gulf Area Command was formally established (the name was changed from Persian Gulf Force to Middle East Force on 16 August 1949) with a seaplane tender as the flag (and only) ship. This formalized a deployment that has continued, at some force level, to this day. The Soviet Union criticized the establishment of the command within a few days.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|--------------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 19 | Security of Norway | 4/29/48 | 4 | A5 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
|----|--------------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Amidst fears of a Communist coup in Norway and growing Soviet press attacks on Norway and Sweden, a U.S. ship visit to Oslo was announced in early April. On 29 April, the aircraft carrier *Valley Forge* and three escorts arrived for a four-day port visit.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|--------------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 20 | Security of Berlin | 6/26/48 | 401 | A5 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
|----|--------------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 1 April 1948, the Soviet Union temporarily restricted Western access to Berlin. On 24 June, all Western transportation to the city was cut off. On 26 June 1948, the Berlin airlift was initiated to offset the blockade. In addition to the two USN transport squadrons that participated in the airlift (and carried over 119,000 tons of supplies into the city), a carrier battle group (CVBG) was moved into the North Atlantic, and the Sixth Fleet was reinforced (including a reinforcement of the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (MARG)). One of the strongest military signals was the deployment, for the first time since World War II, of USAF bomber squadrons from the United States to bases in the United Kingdom. The blockade was declared lifted by the Soviets on 12 May 1949. The airlift continued through 30 September 1949.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----------------------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 21 | Relations w/Argentina | Nov-48 | 7 | A4 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|----|-----------------------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In the fall of 1948, a period of gradually worsening U.S.-Argentinian relations was generally linked to the 9 September speech by the Argentinian leader in which he threatened to hang his opponents. Relations improved in November following a two-ship USN port visit.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 22 | Gov Change, China | 12/9/49 | 38 | P4 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
|----|-------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 8 December 1949, the Nationalist government and forces withdrew to Taiwan and formally established the Republic of China (ROC). The next day, the U.S. Navy announced that the Pacific Fleet was understrength and would be reinforced by vessels from the Atlantic. On 29 December, CV-21 *Boxer* was assigned to the Western Pacific in the first aircraft carrier deployment there since April 1949.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|------------------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 23 | Kor. War, For. Straits | 6/27/50 | 951 | P4 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
|----|------------------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

During the Korean War, USN forces were ordered to the Formosa Straits on a number of occasions to counteract threats of an invasion of Taiwan by the People's Republic of China (PRC). For example, at the very beginning of the war, aircraft from the carrier *Valley Forge* (CV-45) flew over Taipei in a demonstration of U.S. commitment to the Republic of China. The surface patrol force typically included two cruisers and five destroyers. In April 1951, Task Force 77 (TF 77) was ordered to the Formosa Straits from Korean waters to counteract a threatened invasion of Taiwan from Communist China. TF 77 operated in the Straits from 11 to 14 April, then returned to Korean waters.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----------------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 24 | Kor. War, Sec. Europe | 7/16/50 | 715 | A5 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
|----|-----------------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

With the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula, it was feared that the Soviets would invade Western Europe. Over the next two years, U.S. forces were built up in Europe and numerous naval alerts occurred. By mid-July, for example, the Sixth Fleet was augmented with one carrier (CVA-41 *Midway*) and one destroyer division, and the afloat Marine force was reinforced. In mid-August, two destroyers were diverted from Northern European port visits to Iceland as a "large" Soviet fishing fleet moved near the island. Major U.S. Army formations were reintroduced into Europe in this period as well.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 25 | Lebanon | 8/14/50 | 1 | A6 | Y | 2 | N | N | | N | N |
|----|---------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

At the request of the Lebanese Government, USS *Midway* (CVB), *Leyte* (CVL), *Salem* (CA), *Columbus* (CA), and destroyers visited Beirut and gave a carrier aircraft demonstration. This demonstrated U.S. presence in the Mediterranean in spite of the deep U.S. involvement in Korea.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|------------------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 26 | Security of Yugoslavia | 3/15/51 | 869 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|------------------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In the summer of 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Comintern. Over the next several years, there were serious tensions between Yugoslavia and its Communist neighbors. In March 1951, Tito claimed that Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union were massing forces along Yugoslavia's border. In mid-March, a reinforced Marine Corps battalion arrived in the area. Later in March, the relief force for the Mediterranean arrived six weeks early to cover "the politically critical spring period." In the last week of May, the Fleet was augmented with another aircraft carrier. In December, CA-134 *Des Moines* visited Fiume, the first port visit to Yugoslavia since the end of the war. In September 1952, President Tito went to sea aboard the carrier *Coral Sea* (a demonstration to the Soviet Union that American aid was available and acceptable to Yugoslavia).

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----------------------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 27 | China-Taiwan Conflict | 2/2/53 | 2 | P4 | Y | ? | N | N | | N | N |
|----|-----------------------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Three years after President Truman gave TF 77 orders to operate in the Formosa Straits to prevent an attack both by the PRC on Taiwan and by the Republic of China (ROC) against the mainland, President Eisenhower ordered that TF 72 should cease the blockade of Taiwan. Eisenhower's goal was to "de-neutralize" the island; it was hoped that by allowing ROC raids on the mainland, the PRC would be induced to negotiate more seriously in Korea.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 28 | Dien Bien Phu | 3/13/54 | 90 | P4 | Y | 2 | N | N | Y | N | N |
|----|---------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

On 13 March 1954, the battle for Dien Bien Phu began in earnest as the Viet Minh launched their first major assaults on the French garrison. On 19 March, USN forces in the region, including the carriers *Wasp* and *Essex*, were put on alert. The carrier task group steamed on 22 March for a position off the Indochina coast. On 18 April, USMC pilots flew 25 aircraft from *Saipan* (CVL-48) to a French airfield in Indochina. On 7 May, Dien Bien Phu fell. Through this period, from 21 April to 10 June, USAF transports flew volunteer French paratroopers to Indochina. In mid-July, the possibility of U.S. intervention grew and the 3rd Marine Division was put on alert for movement to Indochina from 12 July to the signing of the armistice agreement in Geneva five days later.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|--------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 29 | Honduras-Guatemala | 5/20/54 | 14 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|--------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In January 1954, the leftist Guatemalan Government requested arms from the Soviet Bloc in reaction to a U.S. decision to support an anti-Government "liberation" movement. On 20 May, the first Soviet arms shipment arrived. On that day, the Caribbean Sea Frontier established air-sea patrols in the Gulf of Honduras to protect Honduras from invasion and to control arms shipments to Guatemala. On 3 June, the United States airlifted arms to Honduras. Four days later, CINCLANTFLT ordered a contingency evacuation force to the area. This force included an ASW carrier and five amphibious ships with a Marine BLT aboard. On 18 June, the United States announced a complete arms embargo against Guatemala. The crisis ended after a 29 June army coup that led to an anti-Communist government in Guatemala.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 30 | PRC Shootdown | 7/24/54 | 6 | P4 | Y | 2 | N | N | | N | N |
|----|---------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 23 July 1954, PRC aircraft shot down a Cathay Pacific (U.K.) airliner, killing 10 of 18 people aboard (including 6 Americans). USN aircraft from the carriers *Philippine Sea* and *Hornet* provided air cover to the rescue operations. On 26 July, three aircraft from *Philippine Sea* shot down two PRC fighters that had fired upon them.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---------------------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 31 | Vietnam Evacuations | Aug-54 | 305 | P4 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|---------------------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Acting under the terms of the Indochina accords of 1954, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps helped relocate military personnel, civilians, and materiel from North to South Vietnam. Over the course of operation "Passage to Freedom" over 293,000 civilians, 17,846 military personnel, 88,000 tons of cargo, and 8,100 vehicles were transported. The operation involved 109 ships and craft, 59 of which were from the amphibious forces.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|--------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 32 | Honduran Elections | Oct-54 | 11 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|--------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 1 October 1954, four Marine rifle platoons and a small command group from FMFLANT were put on alert for a possible evacuation of U.S. and other foreign nationals due to expected violence during the Honduran national elections. The four platoons were airlifted to Guantanamo the next day. The Marines were deployed aboard the *Olmstead* which stood 60 n.mi. off the Honduran coast from the 3rd through the 12th.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 33 | Accord on Trieste | 10/7/54 | 20 | A6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | Y |
|----|-------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 5 October 1954, an agreement settling the nine-year-old Trieste discord was signed. Ships from the Sixth Fleet moved into the Adriatic Sea as the 3,000 U.S. Army occupation troops were withdrawn. The withdrawal was completed on 26 October.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----------------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 34 | Tachen Islands | 2/8/55 | 6 | P4 | Y | 6 | Y | Y | | Y | N |
|----|----------------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In January 1955, PRC forces began to bombard the Tachen Islands, and in early February, the ROC decided to evacuate several of the islands. U.S. Navy ships evacuated more than 15,000 civilians and 11,000 military personnel from the islands. The evacuation was covered by the six carriers of TF 77: *Yorktown*, *Kearsage*, *Essex*, *Wasp*, *Midway*, and *Boxer*. A special 209-man shore party from the Third Marine Division aided in the evacuation.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----------------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 35 | Red Sea Patrols | Feb-56 | 183 | A7 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|----|-----------------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In response to the growing tension in the Middle East (which centered around the Suez Canal), a destroyer patrol was formed in the Red Sea.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|--------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 36 | Jordan | Mar-56 | 62 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|--------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Following a period of growing internal tension and foreign policy turmoil, King Hussein dismissed British General Glubb as Commander of the Jordanian Arab Legion. In reaction to this move, two carriers (*Coral Sea* and *Randolph*) and an amphibious force were moved into the Eastern Mediterranean. The formation of a new cabinet in May effectively ended this crisis.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 37 | Pre-Suez | Aug-56 | 69 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|----------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956. Tensions immediately rose as both France and the United Kingdom began preparations for military operations. Two carriers (*Coral Sea* and *Randolph*) and an amphibious force (which was reinforced in early September) were moved into the Eastern Mediterranean. The fleet dispersed in mid-September as the level of tensions in the area appeared to subside; however, two BLTs (rather than the normal level of one) were maintained in the Mediterranean until 8 October.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----------|----------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 38 | Suez War | 10/30/56 | 8 | A6 | Y | 3 | Y | Y | | Y | N |
|----|----------|----------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 29 October 1956, Israel attacked Egypt, and the next day, the United Kingdom and France joined in the invasion. The United States opposed the invasion. Major portions of the Sixth Fleet, including three carriers, were moved into the Eastern Mediterranean. Amphibious forces, including USMC BLT 3/2, moved from Suda Bay on 29 October and evacuated more than 2,000 endangered Western nationals from Haifa and Alexandria on November 1st and 2nd. USAF transports flew Western nationals out of Amman and Damascus. On 30 October, TG 81.2 (centered on the carrier *Antietam*) was diverted from a port visit in Rotterdam to the Mediterranean (it arrived on station on 7 October).

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|--------------|----------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 39 | Port Lyautey | 11/29/56 | 57 | A5 | N | 0 | N | Y | | N | N |
|----|--------------|----------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In response to increasing French-Moroccan tensions, which were believed to threaten the U.S. Naval Air Station (NAS) at Port Lyautey, a reinforcing company of Marines was airlifted to augment local defenses. The company was alerted for movement on the 29th and arrived at the NAS on the 31st, 44 hours later. On 7 February 1957, the unit returned to Camp Lejeune.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 40 | Post-Suez | 11/6/56 | 38 | A6 | Y | 8 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|-----------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 5 November 1956, the Soviet Union sent threatening diplomatic notes to Israel, France, and the United Kingdom. The next day, a ceasefire took effect, and Egyptian President Nasser requested the assistance of the Sixth Fleet to forestall Soviet intervention. RLT-2(-) at Camp Lejeune was alerted for movement to the Mid-East and was ordered to Norfolk, where it was put on 48 hours sailing notice. On 7 November, Washington received reports that the Soviet Union would transit six ships from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. In response, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) ordered a three-carrier task force to sail from the United States to the Western Pacific and a two-carrier task force to sail to vicinity of the Azores. USN forces worldwide were ordered to maintain readiness to execute emergency war plans. A combined submarine-aviation barrier was instituted in the GIUK gap as well. On 11 November, BLT 3/3 left Japan for the Persian Gulf. Surveillance operations in the Mediterranean were intensified as well. Tensions continued at a high level until U.N. forces were brought into Egypt to serve as a "buffer" on 15 November. The Sixth Fleet was removed from 24-hour-alert status on 13 December.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----------------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 41 | Cuban Civil War | Dec-56 | 435 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|-----------------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

During the final phases of Castro's campaign from late 1956 through early 1959, U.S. Navy and Marine forces deployed intermittently to the area. The most significant event came following a 23 October 1958 request by the State Department for the evacuation of U.S. nationals from the Cuban port of Nicaro. The next day, *Kleinsmith* (APD-134) conducted the evacuation without incident. The carrier *Roosevelt* stood by farther out to sea as a contingency force to cover the operation. In January 1959, a force of five ships with Marines embarked stood 30 n.mi. off Havana for the possible evacuation of American nationals following the victory of Castro's forces.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 42 | Red Sea Patrols | Feb-57 | 87 | A7 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|----|-----------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

A destroyer patrol was established in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba when it appeared possible that Egypt would attempt to prevent U.S. merchant ships from transitting these waters on their way to Israel or Jordan. The ships were from MIDEASTFOR.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 43 | Jordan Unrest | 4/25/57 | 9 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|---------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 15 April 1957, King Hussein's dismissal of the Jordanian cabinet led to urban demonstrations on the 22nd through the 24th. On the 25th, the new royalist government declared martial law. On the same day, major elements of the Sixth Fleet deployed towards the Eastern Mediterranean to demonstrate American support for the King. The forces included the *Forrestal* and *Lake Champlain* CVBGs, which departed abruptly from French and Italian liberty ports, the battleship *Wisconsin*, two cruisers, 24 destroyers, the MARG, and submarines. Additional Marine forces in Camp Lejeune were alerted for deployment on the 25th but were released on 30 April.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 44 | Haiti | 6/14/57 | 18 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | Y | N | N |
|----|-------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

On 14 June 1957, Haiti's provisional government was overthrown by a military coup. The United States responded with a theater alert of amphibious and surface units of the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 45 | PRC-ROC Tension | Jul-57 | 63 | P4 | Y | 3 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|-----------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In June 1957, a buildup of PRC forces opposite Taiwan was reported. In response, Navy forces were deployed to the region, with the maximum concentration (three aircraft carriers and two amphibious ready groups with embarked Marines) occurring in September.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 46 | Syria | 8/21/57 | 118 | A6 | Y | 4 | Y | Y | Y | Y | N |
|----|-------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

Because of changes in the Syrian Government, Syria's relations with both the United States and neighboring countries deteriorated. Major portions of the Sixth Fleet were moved to the Eastern Mediterranean, and aircraft were redeployed from Western Europe to Adana, Turkey, as the United States assured Syria's neighbors that the United States would support them against external aggression.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----------|----------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 47 | Indonesia | 12/10/57 | 174 | P4 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | Y | N | N |
|----|-----------|----------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

From December 1957 through June 1958, revolts against the authority of the Sukarno regime prompted a number of responses by USN and USMC forces. In March 1958, the Navy established the South China Sea Force which was initially composed of CVS *Princeton*, the cruiser *Bremerton*, destroyers, and an amphibious force with the 1st MEF (RLT-3, HMR(L)-162) aboard. Primarily because of concern over the safety of U.S. citizens and their property, this contingency evacuation force operated north of Sumatra for much of this period. The South China Sea Force was disbanded after the central government contained the rebellions in June 1958.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----------------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 48 | Venezuelan Revolution | 1/21/58 | 2 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|-----------------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Through the first half of 1958, U.S. Naval forces were used to respond to events in Venezuela on a number of occasions. In January 1958, apparently as part of an effort to overthrow the regime of President Peres Jimenes, mob violence broke out in Caracas. On 21 January, a provisional company of Marines embarked upon USS *Des Moines* which proceeded to a station off the coast of Venezuela for potential evacuation operations. The evacuation alert was cancelled the next day, and *Des Moines* returned to Guantanamo where the Marines disembarked.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 49 | Venezuela | 5/13/58 | 3 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | Y |
|----|-----------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 13 May 1958, a mob attacked the motorcade carrying Vice President Nixon from the airport to Caracas, Venezuela. Two companies of the 2d Marine Division were airlifted from Camp Lejeune to Guantanamo, Cuba, where they boarded an amphibious ship (USS *Boxer* and *Boston*). USS *Tarawa* and four destroyers sortied from the East Coast, and four destroyers left Guantanamo. Two Army companies of airborne infantry were moved from Ft. Campbell, Kentucky, to Puerto Rico. The alert was cancelled on the 15th, following the Vice President's departure from Venezuela.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 50 | Lebanon | 5/15/58 | 48 | A6 | Y | 3 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|---------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 15 May 1958, Lebanese President Chamoun informed the U.S. ambassador that U.S. assistance might be requested because Syrian partisans had entered Lebanon. Three aircraft carriers and a reinforced Marine force were deployed off Lebanon's coast. By 1 July, reports that there had been no massive infiltration of forces led to the withdrawal of most of the forces from the area.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 51 | Lebanon | Jul-58 | 93 | A6 | Y | 3 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
|----|---------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 14 July 1958, following serious rioting in Beirut, Lebanese President Chamoun requested U.S. assistance. On the same day, a coup in Iraq overthrew a pro-Western government. The first Marine Corps unit, BLT 2/2, landed the next day. Eventually, four USMC BLTs were ashore with a peak strength of 5,790 Marines. The first U.S. Army troops arrived on 19 July; USA peak-strength was 8,508 troops ashore. The supporting naval force included more than 60 vessels, including 3 carriers and an 8-ocean-going minesweeper (MSO) mine force. The last USMC forces departed Beirut Harbor on 18 October, and the last USA troops left on the 25th.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 52 | Jordan-Iraq | 7/17/58 | 138 | A7 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|----|-------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Following the coup against the pro-Western Iraqi Government, Jordan's King Hussein requested and received a contingent of British paratroopers. Several surface vessels were redeployed in conjunction with the British operation.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|--------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 53 | Quemoy | Aug-58 | 67 | P4 | Y | 6 | Y | Y | | Y | N |
|----|--------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 23 August 1958, PRC forces began to shell the Quemoy Islands group, raising the possibility that the islands might be cut off from Taiwan. By the first week of September, a Marine Amphibious Ready Group and six CVs were in the area (one CV, *Midway*, had left Pearl Harbor on 28 August and arrived off Taiwan on 4 September; another, *Essex*, had been ordered from the Mediterranean on 23 August and arrived off Taiwan a day after *Midway*), and three USMC fighter squadrons from Marine Air Group (MAG) 11 had moved from Japan to Taiwan. Elements of the Seventh Fleet escorted ROC resupply vessels to within 3 miles of the islands. Tensions eased with a ceasefire on 6 October.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|--------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 54 | Panama | 4/30/59 | 5 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|----|--------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 25 April 1959, a small force landed on Panama's Caribbean coast. The United States offered the Panamanian Government small arms, and a small surveillance patrol of two surface ships and four P2Vs was established off Panama's coast to deter additional landings. The invaders surrendered on 1 May.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---------------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 55 | Berlin Crisis | May-59 | 145 | A5 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
|----|---------------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

From the fall of 1958 on, there was growing tension over Berlin as the Soviets threatened to turn control of access to the city over to the German Democratic Republic. From April through September 1959, the Soviets interfered with the transit of supply trains to West Berlin. There was a general alert of Navy forces throughout the world during most of the May through September time frame. The most immediate and visible part of the Navy's response came in the Mediterranean, where the carrier force was brought to an advanced state of readiness and deployed in an alert posture. Second Fleet units were also put on alert and conducted exercises in the Western Atlantic to display U.S. resolve. In addition to involvement in these exercises, a number of USMC units were alerted for deployment (but did not deploy). The response terminated on 30 September 1959 following the end of Soviet harassment along the access routes to West Berlin.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 56 | Laos | Jul-59 | 103 | P4 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
|----|------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In early July 1959, the Laotian Government requested U.S. civilian technicians to assist in the training of the Royal Laotian Army, and later that month, Pathet Lao forces launched an offensive along the North Vietnamese border. In mid-July, elements of the Seventh Fleet (including one CVBG and an amphibious force) were deployed near the Vietnamese coast for possible intervention in Laos. The Seventh Fleet returned to normal operations in October after tensions subsided.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 57 | PRC-ROC | 7/5/59 | 6 | P4 | Y | 2 | ? | N | | N | N |
|----|---------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In relation to growing tensions between the PRC and ROC, and in support of U.S. operational activity off the coast of China, a two-carrier battle group (*Ranger* and *Lexington*) conducted operations in the vicinity of Taiwan.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|--------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 58 | Panama | Aug-59 | 93 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|----|--------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In reaction to growing civil disorder in Panama, surface combatants were used for surveillance operations. The surveillance operations continued through November 1959.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 59 | Congo | 7/1/60 | 124 | A4 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
|----|-------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

The former Belgian Congo (now Zaire) became independent on 30 June 1960. Elements of the army quickly revolted, and widespread civil disorder resulted. CVS *Wasp*, with a Marine company aboard, was dispatched to assist in the evacuation of Western nationals. Over the next two and one-half years, USN ships supported U.N. forces in the Congo by providing sealift for U.N. force contingents. Four Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) ships transported over 4000 UN troops and 37,640 tons of cargo. Operations ended 29 July 1963.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----------|----------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 60 | Guatemala | 11/14/60 | 27 | A3 | Y | 2 | N | N | | N | N |
|----|-----------|----------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

At the request of the Nicaraguan and Guatemalan Governments, President Eisenhower ordered the Navy to establish a patrol off of their Caribbean coasts to guard against possible infiltration. The patrol force included one CVA (*Shangri-La*), one CVS (*Wasp*), and eight surface ships.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 61 | Laos | 1/1/61 | 6 | P4 | Y | 3 | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
|----|------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

Following the Pathet Lao capture of strategic positions on the central plain of Laos, Seventh Fleet forces (including two CVAs (*Lexington* and *Coral Sea*), one CVS (*Bennington*), and an amphibious force) were ordered to the South China Sea. After the situation in Laos stabilized, the units were directed to withdraw on 6 January.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----------------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 62 | SS <i>Santa Maria</i> | 1/23/61 | 8 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|----|-----------------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Following the seizure of the Portuguese-flag cruise ship *Santa Maria*, which had more than 600 passengers and crew aboard, by 70 armed passengers, on 23 January 1961 LANTFLT units were ordered to find and trail the hijacked vessel. Patrol forces included at least one DD, AO, AOG, and a number of patrol aircraft. The ship entered port at Recife, Brazil, after the USN forces had boxed it in. The hijackers surrendered shortly thereafter.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 63 | Gulf of Guinea-Congo | 2/2/61 | 34 | A4 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|----------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In early February 1961, the Amity I task force (two amphibious ships and two destroyers) provided troop lift for U.N. forces in the Congo. As the situation deteriorated, the Amity I force was rerouted to the area on 5 March, apparently at the request of the U.S. Ambassador. On 7 March, the force was released from contingency operations.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 64 | Laos | 3/21/61 | 85 | P4 | Y | 3 | Y | Y | Y | N | N |
|----|------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

Because of the deteriorating position of government forces in Laos, elements of the Seventh Fleet were ordered to the South China Sea. While on station, U.S. Navy aircraft conducted reconnaissance missions over Laos. The alert status of the force was relaxed following the start of cease-fire negotiations in mid-June.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-------------------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 65 | SS <i>Western Union</i> | 3/31/61 | 1 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|----|-------------------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 31 March 1961, a Cuban gunboat detained the 92-ton cable-ship *Western Union* in international waters. The destroyer *John H. Weeks* and a number of aircraft were sent to the scene. After six hours, the Cubans released *Western Union*, and *Weeks* escorted her to Key West.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 66 | Bay of Pigs | Apr-61 | 62 | A3 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | Y | N |
|----|-------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 17 April 1961, American-trained and -supported Cuban exiles invaded Cuba. By 20 April, Cuban forces had decisively defeated the exiles. Carrier task forces and at least one Marine Corps battalion stood by during the operation. USN units remained in the vicinity as the United States attempted to ensure that the captured exiles were not abused by the Cuban Government and tried to negotiate terms for their release.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|--------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 67 | Dominican Republic | 5/30/61 | 12 | A3 | Y | 3 | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
|----|--------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

General Rafael Trujillo was assassinated on 30 May 1961. The Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron was reinforced by two additional amphibious squadrons, and a three-carrier task force was deployed to the region. The alert was cancelled on 10 June as the Dominican Republic's domestic situation stabilized.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 68 | Zanzibar | Jun-61 | 31 | P6 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|----------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In response to rioting on Zanzibar, the vessels of the Amity II force moved to the vicinity of the island. The safety of the U.S. space-tracking station on the island was a principal concern.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|--------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 69 | Kuwait | 7/4/61 | 4 | P6 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|--------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Shortly following Kuwait's independence (19 June 1961), Iraq claimed that Kuwait had been improperly withheld from Iraq and that Iraq planned to annex Kuwait. On 30 June, Kuwait requested assistance from the United Kingdom, and Royal Marines landed within 24 hours. On 4 July, the five vessels of the Amity II cruise were directed to sail to the vicinity of Aden to serve as a contingency force. This order was cancelled on 7 July.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---------------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 70 | Berlin Crisis | Jul-61 | 102 | A5 | Y | 3 | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
|----|---------------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

Following a period of increased Soviet pressure over the status of Berlin, German Democratic Republic forces established barriers along the border between the two sectors of Berlin on 13 August 1961. In response, the United States sent reinforcements to the Berlin Brigade. Before this, in response to the mounting Soviet pressure, the Navy's forces were augmented with 33 reserve ships and about 8,000 Naval Reserve personnel. Elements of the Sixth Fleet were put on alert, and a CVS group was moved to the northeast Atlantic in August.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|--------------------|----------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 71 | Dominican Republic | 11/18/61 | 32 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|--------------------|----------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 18 November, Dominican President Balaguer declared a state of emergency following the return to the Dominican Republic of two brothers of the slain former dictator, Gen. Rafael Trujillo (see response 67). The Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron was deployed off the coast and was reinforced by the *Roosevelt* CVBG. Naval forces included at least 13 surface combatants, MINDIV 43, PHIBRON 8 with a USMC BLT embarked, and VMA 224. Operational activity included amphibious force feints directed at the beach and flyovers of A-4Ds just outside Dominican territorial waters to underscore Secretary of State Rusk's statement that the United States would not "remain idle" if the Trujillos attempted to reestablish the dictatorship. The Navy's response ended following the formation of a Council of State on 19 December.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---------------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 72 | South Vietnam | Dec-61 | 244 | P4 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | Y |
|----|---------------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

During the December 1961 through August 1962 period, the United States increased its military involvement in Vietnam. In December, for example, the first major U.S. Army contingent arrived. On 22 December, a newly formed USN anti-infiltration coastal patrol began operations. For three months, March through May, these patrols were augmented by DEs activated in response to the Berlin crisis. These patrols terminated on 1 August 1962.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|--------------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 73 | Dominican Republic | 1/18/62 | 2 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|--------------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 18 January 1962, a coup ousted the regime in the Dominican Republic. Within six hours, a USN force was ready for a planned show-of-force operation. The deployment was cancelled on 19 January, apparently because the United States was satisfied with the course of events in the Dominican Republic.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 74 | Guatemala Riots | 3/14/62 | 9 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|-----------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Following student rioting on 13 March 1962, which led to an outbreak of more general civil disorder, the United States established a precautionary deployment off the coast of Guatemala. The force included the CVA *Midway* and the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 75 | South Vietnam | 4/15/62 | 849 | P4 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|---------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 15 April 1962, a Marine helicopter squadron (HMM-362) arrived at Soc Trang. It was the first USMC aviation unit to arrive in the Republic of Vietnam (three USA helicopter squadrons had already arrived in country), and its arrival denoted a qualitative change in Navy/Marine Corps operations in South Vietnam. The mission was to provide helicopter troop and cargo lift for Vietnamese Army units.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 76 | Thailand | 5/10/62 | 90 | P4 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|----------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Following major victories by Pathet Lao forces that moved their units closer to the Thai border, the United States carried out an administrative landing of Marine forces in Thailand at the request of the government of Thailand. The operation involved the carriers *Valley Forge* and *Hancock*. About 3,400 Marines moved to Thailand between 17 and 20 May, and took up defensive positions in north Thailand. The United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand sent forces to Thailand as well.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 77 | Guantanamo | 7/25/62 | 3 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

For the first eight months of 1962, there was a particularly serious period of harassment of the U.S. base at Guantanamo. A major response took place in July when it was feared that the security of the installation might be threatened in conjunction with Cuban celebration of the 26th of July revolutionary holiday. The Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron deployed to Guantanamo on 25 July, and major air demonstrations were conducted over the base that evening. The alert was terminated on the 27th.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 78 | Haiti Civil Disorder | Aug-62 | 14 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|----------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In early August 1962, U.S. decision-makers were apprehensive concerning potential civil disorders in Haiti. In response, the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron was positioned for possible employment, and a two-destroyer patrol was established in the Gulf of Gonave.

Table 6. (Continued)

| Nc. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 79 | Yemen | Sep-62 | 213 | A7 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|----|-------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In September 1962, following the outbreak of a civil war in Yemen, the number of destroyers assigned to the Middle East Force was increased from three to four. A patrol was established in the Red Sea to "contain the war and protect U.S. interests and nationals." The patrols lasted until April 1963.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----------------------|----------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 80 | Cuban Missile Crisis | 10/14/62 | 38 | A3 | Y | 8 | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
|----|----------------------|----------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

A 14 October overflight provided evidence that Soviet MRBMs were deployed in Cuba. On 22 October, President Kennedy announced a quarantine of the island nation. Approximately 180 U.S. Navy ships, including 8 carriers and a 60-ship amphibious force, and more than 25,000 Marines from both coasts were involved in the response. The blockade was lifted on 20 November. The last FMFLANT forces were released from contingency orders on 18 December.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----------------|----------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 81 | Sino-Indian War | 11/19/62 | 2 | P6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
|----|-----------------|----------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

During the Sino-Indian War, Indian Prime Minister Nehru requested U.S. fighters for possible combat operations against the PRC. In response, an American aircraft carrier was dispatched from the Pacific towards Indian waters; but the crisis passed 24 hours after Nehru made this appeal, and the CV turned back before it reached the Bay of Bengal.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----------------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 82 | SS <i>Anzoatequi</i> | 2/12/63 | 9 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|----|----------------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 12 February 1963, the Venezuelan merchant ship *Anzoatequi* was seized in Santo Domingan waters by "Cuban-oriented leftists." U.S. Navy air and surface units tracked the ship from 16 through 20 February, when Brazilian Navy forces took it under control.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 83 | Laos | Apr-63 | 35 | P4 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

After Pathet Lao forces had inflicted serious defeats on the neutralist faction in Laos, U.S. forces deployed to the area. The two carriers (*Ticonderoga* and *Ranger*) and a three-ship amphibious group returned to normal Seventh Fleet assignments on 5 May, two weeks after a cease-fire agreement was reached.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 84 | Haitian Unrest | 4/29/63 | 34 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|----------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In March 1963, Atlantic Fleet forces began operations, and VMA-533 was deployed to Guantanamo to provide air support off Haiti due to a worsening domestic situation. On 16 April 1963, the Haitian Government announced it had uncovered a plot to overthrow the Duvalier regime. Over the coming weeks, tension continued to mount. On 29 April, a 30-man USMC training force was withdrawn from Haiti. On 8 May, Navy ships, including LPH *Boxer*, evacuated 2,279 civilians. Reserve forces came from the 4th MEB, with the command element embarked on LPH *Thetis Bay* and both the United Kingdom and France also deployed ships during the crisis. On 17 May, the United States broke diplomatic relations with Haiti. On 3 June, following stabilization of the situation, the United States resumed diplomatic relations and the Navy forces were released from contingency tasking.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|--|------------------------|---------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
| 85 | Haiti Civil War | 8/6/63 | 17 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| <p>Groups of Haitian exiles invaded Haiti on 5 and 15 August 1963. On 6 August, the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron sailed to the Gulf of Gonave, where it remained until 22 August. The Haitian Government easily defeated the rebels.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 86 | Vietnam Civil Disorder | 8/25/63 | 93 | P4 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| <p>U.S. Navy forces responded to domestic disturbances in South Vietnam that culminated in the 1 November 1963 coup overthrowing President Diem. On 25 August, CINCPACFLT was ordered to station Naval forces off the South Vietnamese coast and be prepared to evacuate American nationals. On 11 September, CINCPAC returned all Navy forces to normal operations. This deployment was the first of several in the worsening South Vietnamese internal crisis. Shortly following the coup, two aircraft carriers (<i>Hancock</i> and <i>Oriskany</i>) and an amphibious force were operating off the Vietnam coast. On 7 November, the last units were released for normal operations.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 87 | PRC-ROC | 9/20/63 | 5 | P4 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| <p>On 20 September 1963, the CVA <i>Hancock</i> was directed to move to a position off Taiwan in anticipation of a PRC bombardment of the offshore islands. This followed a period of active ROC raiding of the mainland.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 88 | Dominican Republic | 9/25/63 | 81 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| <p>On 25 September 1963, a coup overthrew the government of President Bosch. The United States suspended diplomatic relations and cut off economic aid. The Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron was alerted for the response. The alert was cancelled on 14 December.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 89 | Indonesia-Malaysia | Oct-63 | 78 | P4 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| <p>The Federation of Malaysia was created on 16 September. The Sukarno regime in Indonesia laid claim to some of Malaysia's territories and conducted a guerilla war in provinces on the island of Borneo. The Western response was carried out primarily by the United Kingdom. There were, however, a number of demonstrative actions taken by the United States, including a 29 November through 17 December port visit by the seaplane carrier AV <i>Salisbury Sound</i> to Singapore.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 90 | Zanzibar | 1/12/64 | 2 | P6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| <p>On 12 January, a rebel movement overthrew the regime in Zanzibar. On 13 January, the USN DD <i>Manley</i> evacuated 54 U.S. citizens and 36 nationals of other countries to Tanganyika.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 91 | Tanganyika | 1/20/64 | 7 | P6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| <p>On 20 January 1964, there was an army mutiny in Tanganyika. The DD <i>Manley</i> was directed to return there for possible evacuations. On 25 January, British forces landed and put down the mutiny.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|---|---------------------|---------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
| 92 | Carib. Surveillance | 1/15/64 | 92 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| As a result of possible arms smuggling, a two-destroyer patrol was stationed in the southern Caribbean for surveillance and interception operations. | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 93 | Panama | Jan-64 | 101 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | Y |
| Following serious rioting in the Canal Zone (which left 4 U.S. soldiers and 20 Panamanians dead), the Government of Panama suspended diplomatic relations with the United States on 9 January. An amphibious force was kept in the region until a week following the 3 April U.S.-Panamanian agreements that restored diplomatic recognition. | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 94 | Venezuela | Jan-64 | 310 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| The United States established special surveillance operations in response to reports that Cuba was supplying Venezuelan rebels with arms and personnel. The patrol aircraft and surface ship patrols were terminated on 7 November, after observing more than 200 vessels. | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 95 | Cyprus | 1/22/64 | 269 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| After conflict between Greek and Turkish factions renewed on 21 January 1964, elements of the Sixth Fleet were deployed to the vicinity of Cyprus. Although U.S. Navy vessels conducted patrols off Cyprus throughout this period, there were several phases to this conflict. Aircraft carriers were deployed off Cyprus for most of March, early June, and from 8 August to 2 September. | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 96 | Brazil | 3/31/64 | 4 | A4 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| Following domestic unrest, the <i>Forrestal</i> CVBG moved off Santos, Brazil. This unit was on station from 31 March to 3 April. There was a military coup, and a new President was sworn in on 2 April. | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 97 | Laos | 4/21/64 | 42 | P4 | Y | 2 | N | Y | | Y | N |
| Following an abortive rightist coup attempt on 19 April, Pathet Lao units made gains. On 21 April, the <i>Kitty Hawk</i> CVBG and the Afloat Landing Force Seventh Fleet were ordered to a position in the South China Sea. On 18 May, carrier aircraft began low-level aerial reconnaissance missions over Laos. Following the 7 and 8 June shooting down of Navy reconnaissance aircraft, planes from <i>Constellation</i> and <i>Kitty Hawk</i> flew air strikes against Pathet Lao antiaircraft positions. On 21 May, the standing carrier presence at Yankee Station in the South China Sea was initiated. | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 98 | Guantanamo | 5/1/64 | 7 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| In the midst of serious Cuban harassment of the Guantanamo base, there were indications on 27 April 1964 that the Cuban Government intended to have demonstrations take place along the base's perimeter. The Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron deployed to the base for the period 1-7 May. | | | | | | | | | | | |

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|--------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 99 | Panama | 5/7/64 | 14 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|----|--------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Because of fears that violence might accompany the Panamanian presidential elections, the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron was deployed off the coast of Panama. It remained there for a week, following the 13 May certification of the election results.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 100 | Dominican Republic | 7/24/64 | 5 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|--------------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

U.S. Navy surface ships and patrol aircraft conducted four days of special patrol operations designed to detect Cuban arms shipments directed at the Dominican Republic.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|----------------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 101 | Gulf of Tonkin | 8/2/64 | 9 | P4 | Y | 2 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|----------------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 2 August 1964, North Vietnamese MTBs engaged the USN destroyer *Maddox*; two of the patrol boats were sunk. On 4 August, two destroyers were engaged, and again two patrol boats were sunk. On 5 August, aircraft from the carriers *Ticonderoga* and *Constellation* carried out retaliatory strikes against the North Vietnamese mainland.

NOTE: The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 10 August 1964 is used as the starting point for the Vietnam/Indochina War. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps activity in the region from this point through December 1974 are considered to be part of the conflict and thus are excluded from consideration in this work.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 102 | Haiti | 8/7/64 | 3 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|-------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 7 August 1964, CINCLANT initiated a two-day surveillance operation designed to locate a ship that was believed to be connected with Haitian military forces.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 103 | Panama | 1/7/65 | 6 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | N | | N | N |
|-----|--------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In anticipation of possible rioting that might accompany the first anniversary of the 9 January 1964 riots, forces in USCINCSO were put on alert. One LST was put on alert for the 9-12 January period.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|----------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 104 | Tanzania | 1/17/65 | 1 | P6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|----------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 17 January 1965, a destroyer was ordered to move to a position off Tanzania following the request by the Department of State for a ship for potential evacuation of U.S. nationals from the country. The alert was cancelled later that same day.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 105 | Venezuela-Colombia | Jan-65 | 91 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|--------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In response to reports of clandestine arms shipments and movement of personnel, surface ship and aircraft surveillance patrols were established in the Caribbean.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|----------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 106 | British Guiana | Apr-65 | 11 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|----------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In response to domestic violence, air and surface patrols were established. On 11 April, Navy aircraft located a Cuban ship that was believed to be carrying arms to rebel forces within British Guiana. Surveillance was held until a Royal Navy vessel arrived on the scene.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 107 | Dominican Republic | 4/24/65 | 515 | A3 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
|-----|--------------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Following a period of mounting tension in the Dominican Republic, the U.S. Embassy indicated on 25 April 1965 that a landing might be required to protect American lives and conduct evacuations. Between 27 and 30 April, some 2,400 evacuees were removed by the deployed amphibious force. The first Marines (BLT 3/6) went ashore on 28 April and the first U.S. Army troops arrived by air on 30 April. Peak U.S. strength ashore came on 17 May, with 7,958 Marines, 14,889 Army troops, and 1,000 Air Force personnel in the Dominican Republic. On 14 May, the first Organization of American States (OAS) troops arrived; the OAS force eventually included contingents from Brazil, Honduras, Paraguay, Panama, Costa Rica, and El Salvador. On 26 May, USMC troops began to be withdrawn from the country. The last U.S. Army troops were withdrawn on 21 September 1966.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 108 | Yemen | Jul-65 | 32 | P6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|-------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

July and August 1965 were critical months in the Yemeni civil war. MIDEASTFOR surface combatants carried out surveillance and presence missions during this period.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 109 | Cyprus | 8/3/65 | 30 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|-----|--------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

During a period of growing tension on Cyprus that centered on proposed changes to the electoral system, a CVBG and the MARG (BLT 2/2) operated off the island.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 110 | Indo-Pakistani War | 9/11/65 | 25 | P6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|--------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

The Indo-Pakistani War broke out in the first week of September 1965. On 11 September, two MIDEASTFOR ships left Bahrain en route to Karachi, Pakistan, to act as a contingency evacuation force. On the 15th, USAF planes evacuated U.S. civilians from West Pakistan.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-----------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 111 | Indonesia | 10/2/65 | 8 | P4 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|-----|-----------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 30 September 1965, there was an abortive rebellion involving elements of the Indonesian Communist Party and the Indonesian army. An amphibious task force stood by as a contingency evacuation force following the attempted coup during a period of heavy fighting from 2 through 9 October.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 112 | Greek Coup | 4/21/67 | 23 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|-----|------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

The military coup occurred on 21 April 1965. In response, the *America* CVBG was immediately dispatched to the Ionian Sea. Two amphibious groups (with RLT 6 embarked) were included in the contingency task force.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|---|-------------------------|----------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
| 113 | Six Day War | 6/6/67 | 6 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| <p>On 13 May 1967, Egypt reinforced its forces in the Sinai border and Israel mobilized in response. Following several weeks of growing tension, the war began on 5 June. The fleet was initially held back to indicate American noninvolvement in the fighting, while the MARG was alerted for a possible noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO). On 6 June, two carrier task forces moved closer to the fighting. On 10 June, the President ordered a high-speed carrier movement toward Syria to facilitate a cease-fire agreement.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 114 | DD <i>Eilat</i> Sinking | 10/21/67 | 12 | A6 | Y | 2 | N | N | | N | N |
| <p>On 21 October 1967, Egyptian ships sunk the Israeli destroyer <i>Eilat</i> using surface-to-surface missiles. In response, two carrier task forces were ordered to a position 100 miles north of Egypt.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 115 | Cyprus | 11/15/67 | 24 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| <p>On 15 November 1967, there was renewed communal violence on Cyprus. This led to a contingency deployment of Sixth Fleet units in anticipation of possible evacuations. On the 24th, U.S. citizens were evacuated by commercial aircraft with no military involvement.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 116 | USS <i>Pueblo</i> | 1/24/68 | 59 | P4 | Y | 3 | N | N | | Y | N |
| <p>On 23 January 1968, North Korean forces seized USS <i>Pueblo</i> in international waters. On the 24th, Task Group (TG) 70.6 (CVA <i>Enterprise</i>) was directed to Korea. Through 22 March, a standing two-carrier force was maintained off Korea, and intermittent deployments were maintained after that point until the release of <i>Pueblo</i>'s crew on 22 December.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 117 | EC-121 Shootdown | 4/14/69 | 26 | P4 | Y | 4 | N | N | | Y | Y |
| <p>On 15 April 1969, a U.S. Navy reconnaissance plane was shot down by Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korean) fighters over the Sea of Japan. Sea-Air Rescue (SAR) efforts began immediately and TF 71 was activated, drawing units from Southeast Asia (including four aircraft carriers). After 26 April, the force was reduced to a one-carrier battle group.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 118 | Curacao Civil Unrest | 5/31/69 | 1 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| <p>Because of riots in Curacao, the fast element of the Caribbean Ready Force (one cruiser and three amphibious ships) was reconstituted on 31 May 1969 and ordered to a position off Curacao in anticipation of possible evacuations. Order was quickly restored, and at sunset on 31 May, the group was ordered to return to normal operations.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 119 | Lebanon-Libya Ops | 10/26/69 | 5 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| <p>On 1 September 1969, a coup overthrew the Libyan monarchy. At the same time, conditions were very unsettled in Lebanon, leading to the 22 October resignation of the Lebanese Prime Minister. Contingency forces in the period 26-30 October included two carrier task forces and the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (MARG) with BLT 1/6 embarked.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|----------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 120 | Trinidad | 4/22/70 | 6 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | Y | N |
|-----|----------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

The Government of Trinidad and Tobago declared a state of emergency on 21 April in response to civil unrest and a mutiny of 80 troops. The Caribbean Ready Group was ordered to sail to the vicinity in preparation for evacuation operations.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 121 | Jordan | 6/11/70 | 7 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | Y | Y | N |
|-----|--------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

On 9 June 1970, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) seized 32 hostages in a hotel in Amman; 14 Americans were among those held. In addition, on the same day, there was an unsuccessful assassination attempt against King Hussein. CVA *Forrestal* moved to the Eastern Mediterranean to provide air cover for potential evacuation operations by the MARG with BLT 1/8 embarked. While the situation in Jordan abated, tensions flared in neighboring Beirut, with an attack on the Jordanian embassy on 12 June. The situation in Lebanon calmed on the 15th, and U.S. forces returned to normal operations on 17 June.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 122 | Jordan | 9/2/70 | 60 | A6 | Y | 3 | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
|-----|--------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

Sixth Fleet units were put on alert on 3 September 1970 because of rising tensions in the region. On 6 September, the PFLP hijacked civilian airliners and took them to Dawson Field. Fighting soon broke out between Jordanian and Palestinian forces. Two CVs (*Independence* and *Saratoga*) and the MARG were in the Eastern Mediterranean. Following Syrian intervention on 18 September, CVA *Kennedy* and elements of the 8th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) were ordered from the East Coast to the Mediterranean. On the 19th, troops in Germany and CONUS (82nd Airborne Division) were alerted for movement. By 24 September, all Syrian forces were out of Jordanian territory, and by 5 October, only one carrier was on station in the Eastern Mediterranean.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 123 | Haiti Succession | 4/22/71 | 37 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | Y | | N | N |
|-----|------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Haitian President Francois Duvalier died on 21 April 1971 and was succeeded as chief of state by his 19-year-old son Jean-Claude. A surface patrol was established in the Windward Passage because of the possibility that the situation might be exploited by Haitian exiles and/or Cuban forces. Additionally, BLT 2/3 was alerted and carried out a contingency reaction drill in CONUS (no amphibious ships were diverted to support this).

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------------------|----------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 124 | Indo-Pakistani War | 12/10/71 | 30 | P6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|-----|--------------------|----------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

The Bangladesh war began on 3 December 1971, and on 7 December, the head of the U.N. relief mission in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) indicated that evacuation of foreign civilians might be required. On 10 December, a CVBG (CVAN *Enterprise*) and an amphibious ready group were ordered to the Indian Ocean. On 12 December, the Royal Air Force evacuated Western nationals from East Pakistan, thereby eliminating the requirement for an American evacuation operation.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------------|----------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 125 | Bahama Lines | 12/15/71 | 52 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|--------------|----------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Following seizure of the steamer *Johnny Express* by Cuban naval forces on 15 December 1971, two U.S. Navy destroyers were put on alert. The remaining four ships of the exile-owned Bahama lines were escorted through the end of January 1972.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 126 | Lebanon | 5/3/73 | 7 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|-----|---------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 3 May 1973, the Palestinian Yarmuk Brigade entered Lebanon from Syria. Two CVBGs (*Forrestal* and *Kennedy*) and the MARG were alerted for potential evacuation operations. By 9 May, the situation had stabilized.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-----------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 127 | Middle East War | 10/6/73 | 48 | A6 | Y | 3 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
|-----|-----------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 6 October 1973, Egyptian and Syrian forces launched a surprise attack on Israel. U.S. Navy forces quickly sortied in response to the war, with two CVBGs (*Independence* and *Roosevelt*) and an amphibious force (with two BLTs embarked) in the Mediterranean and a CVBG (*Kennedy*) in the eastern Atlantic. On 25 October, U.S. forces went on Defense Condition (DEFCON) III alert status, as possible intervention by the Soviet Union was feared. The *Kennedy* CVBG and additional amphibious forces entered the Mediterranean. On 26 October, CINCSAC and CINCONAD reverted to normal DEFCON status. On 31 October, USEUCOM (less the Sixth Fleet) went off DEFCON III status. The Sixth Fleet resumed its normal DEFCON status on 17 November.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------------------|----------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 128 | Middle East Force | 10/24/73 | 22 | A7 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|-------------------|----------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 24 October, the U.S. merchant ship *La Salle* was shot at at the mouth of the Red Sea. Over the next month, a MIDEASTFOR destroyer escorted U.S. merchant ships in the lower Red Sea.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------------------|----------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 129 | Oil Embargo-IO Ops | 10/25/73 | 159 | P6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|--------------------|----------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Following the initiation of the oil embargo in the midst of the October War, a CVBG (*Hancock*) was ordered from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 130 | Cyprus | 7/15/74 | 39 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
|-----|--------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 15 July 1974, immediately after a coup on Cyprus, the carrier *America* was ordered to augment the Sixth Fleet instead of returning to the United States. At the same time, port calls for the *Forrestal* CVBG and the Sixth Fleet amphibious groups were cancelled. On 22 July, the 34th MAU (HMM-162 and BLT 1/8) conducted a NEO from Dhekelia, Cyprus to USS *Coronado*. On 24 July, British helicopters carried evacuees to USS *Trenton*. A total of 752 evacuees (498 Americans) from Cyprus were brought aboard USN vessels. Through August, Sixth Fleet units remained in a high state of readiness in the area as the situation remained tense on the island. On 2 September, the last units were released from contingency tasking.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 131 | Cyprus Unrest | 1/18/75 | 4 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|-----|---------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Following violent Greek Cypriot demonstrations, some of which were outside the American Embassy in Nicosia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered a precautionary deployment of the *Saratoga* CVBG to a position southwest of Cyprus. In addition, units of the Sixth Fleet's amphibious force (34th MAU) were alerted for possible evacuation duty. By 21 January, the situation had quieted and the alert situation was relaxed.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|----------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 132 | Ethiopia | 2/3/75 | 4 | A7 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|----------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In 1974, elements of the Ethiopian military seized control of the government and overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie. As the Ethiopian civil war intensified, a two-ship contingency force took position in the Red Sea for potential evacuation of American citizens who operated the U.S. Navy Communications Station in Asmara. On 4 February, these civilians were evacuated by commercial airliners. On 6 February, the contingency force was released.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|----------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 133 | Eagle Pull, Cambodia | Feb-75 | 70 | P4 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
|-----|----------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

With the growing deterioration of the military situation in Southeast Asia, amphibious force readiness for an evacuation from Phnom Penh was increased in February 1975. In early April, CINCPAC was granted authorization to order Operation Eagle Pull, the evacuation of U.S. personnel from Cambodia. On 10 April, the U.S. Ambassador requested an evacuation, which was carried out on 12 April. A total of 287 persons were evacuated by a force that included Marines (31st MAU, HMH 462, HMH 463), USAF (elements of a CH-53 squadron), and Navy ships (including the carrier *Hancock*).

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|----------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 134 | Frequent Wind, Viet. | 4/18/75 | 12 | P4 | Y | 4 | Y | Y | Y | Y | N |
|-----|----------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

In spring 1975, the South Vietnamese Government was under increasing military pressure and contingency planning for the evacuation of U.S. personnel accelerated. Following the completion of Operation Eagle Pull, TF 76 headed to Subic Bay for upkeep. This was cut short, as TF 76 was ordered to the waters off South Vietnam on 18 April. On 21 April, the units were put on a 6-hour alert for execution of the evacuation. On 29 April, the evacuation was executed, with the operation declared complete on the morning of the 30th, just four hours prior to the South Vietnamese government's announcement of unconditional surrender. Forces involved included four carriers (two as helicopter carriers -- *Midway* and *Hancock* -- and two providing air support -- *Enterprise* and *Coral Sea*), the 9th MAB (with over 6,000 Marines), and USAF elements from SAC, and the 7th and 13th Air Forces. Nearly 7,000 persons were evacuated.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|----------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 135 | Mayaguez | 5/13/75 | 3 | P4 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | Y | N |
|-----|----------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 12 May 1975, the SS *Mayaguez* was seized by Cambodian gunboats and escorted to Koh Tang Island. On 14 May, U.S. Marines (BLT 2/9, elements of BLT 1/4) recaptured the *Mayaguez* and went ashore on Koh Tang Island, releasing the crew. Air cover was flown by USAF fighters operating from Thailand and by aircraft operating off CVA-43 *Coral Sea*.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 136 | Lebanon | Aug-75 | 367 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|-----|---------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

During 1974 and 1975, the situation in Lebanon generally deteriorated as the nation headed toward civil war. In late June, a U.S. Army colonel was kidnapped and held for two weeks. Starting in August, a contingency evacuation force was maintained for the potential evacuation of the approximately 100 U.S. Government employees and 1,000 U.S. citizens in Lebanon.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 137 | Polisario Rebels | 1/5/76 | 18 | A5 | Y | 0 | Y | N | | N | N |
|-----|------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 3 January 1976, the Moroccan Navy stopped a Soviet cargo ship off the Spanish Sahara and found a cargo of arms. In response to the evidence of increased Soviet support for the Polisario rebels, U.S. Navy vessels made three port visits in Morocco during January 1976.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 138 | Tunisia | 7/27/76 | 25 | A6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|---------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

To reassure Tunisian officials following Libyan threats against Tunisia, the U.S. Embassy at Tunis requested that the port visit by two vessels to Tunis be extended. A frigate made a port visit at Sfax several weeks later at the request of the State Department.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 139 | Kenya-Uganda | 7/8/76 | 20 | P6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|--------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Because of the possibility of Ugandan military operations against Kenya following the Israeli raid on Entebbe airport, the *Ranger* CVBG was ordered from the South China Sea to the Western Indian Ocean. In addition, two MIDEASTFOR frigates made successive port calls in Mombassa in mid-July. *Ranger* was released on 27 July.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|----------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 140 | Korean Tree Incident | 8/19/76 | 21 | P4 | Y | 1 | N | N | Y | Y | Y |
|-----|----------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

Following the murder of two U.S. Army officers (and wounding of four U.S. and five South Korean soldiers) on 18 August 1976 in the Demilitarized Zone, a general buildup and alert of forces occurred in South Korea. The *Midway* CVBG was ordered from Yokosuka to an operating area in the approaches to the Korea Strait, where it remained until released on 8 September.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 141 | Uganda | 2/25/77 | 6 | P6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|--------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In response to restrictions placed on Americans in Uganda by President Amin, the *Enterprise* CVBG was ordered to move to a position off the coast of Kenya. The CVBG was released to normal operations after Amin lifted all travel restrictions on Americans.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 142 | Ogaden War | Feb-78 | 51 | P6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | Y | N |
|-----|------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In late February 1978, surface ships from MIDEASTFOR began surveillance operations of the Somali invasion of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Following the collapse of the Somali army in the Ogaden, the *Kitty Hawk* CVBG was ordered to a holding point north of Singapore. On 23 March, the CVBG was released without having been sent into the Indian Ocean.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|----------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 143 | Sea of Okhotsk | 6/15/78 | 10 | P4 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|----------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Following increased Soviet military activity in the Far East, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown asserted that the United States did not recognize the Sea of Japan as a Soviet sanctuary. A week later, three USN ships began operations in the Sea of Japan to underscore the Secretary of Defense's comments and to demonstrate the right of free navigation in international waters.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 144 | Afghanistan | Jul-78 | 31 | P6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|-------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

During the growing unrest in Afghanistan, the *Enterprise* CVBG was ordered to remain in the vicinity of Diego Garcia. *Enterprise* was released as of 31 July.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-----------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 145 | Nicaragua | 9/16/78 | 16 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | N | | Y | N |
|-----|-----------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Following a period of growing civil strife in Nicaragua, CINCLANTFLT ordered surface ship surveillance operations off the west coast of Nicaragua on 16 September 1978. The operations began on 20 September and continued until 1 October.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 146 | Iranian Revolution | 12/6/78 | 86 | P6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | Y | N |
|-----|--------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 6 December 1978, following a deterioration in the internal situation in Iran, three surface vessels were ordered to remain in the Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea region following completion of exercise "Midlink." From 28 December through 28 January 1979, the *Constellation* CVBG was kept in the Singapore area for possible deployment to the Indian Ocean. On 14 February, armed leftists briefly took over the American Embassy in Tehran. On 18 and 21 February, Western nationals were evacuated from Bandar Abbas and Chah Bahar by RN and commercial ships (many of the evacuees were transferred to USN ships in international waters).

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 147 | China-Vietnam | 2/25/79 | 6 | P4 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|---------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In response to the 22 February 1979 PRC invasion of North Vietnam and a large Soviet deployment of vessels to the region, USN vessels including the *Constellation* CVBG, entered the South China Sea to monitor the situation.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 148 | Yemen | 3/6/79 | 93 | P6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | Y | N |
|-----|-------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 6 March 1979, the *Constellation* CVBG was ordered from the South China Sea to the Gulf of Aden. The deployment to monitor the fighting between North and South Yemen was, most likely, meant to reassure the Saudis that the United States intended to remain in the region despite the fall of the Shah. A carrier presence was kept in the region until 6 June.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-----------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 149 | Nicaraguan Revolution | Jul-79 | 31 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|-----|-----------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

A contingency evacuation force, centered on LHA-2 *Saipan*, operated off the coast of Nicaragua for possible evacuation of American diplomats and other individuals due to the turmoil surrounding the fall of the Somoza government.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-----------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 150 | Soviet Troops in Cuba | 10/2/79 | 46 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | Y | N |
|-----|-----------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 2 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued an executive order directing the establishment of a Caribbean contingency task force, following a month of news reports about the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba. On 11 October, 1,800 Marines left Morehead City en route to Guantanamo as part of a reinforcement exercise. In mid-October, the *Forrestal* CVBG transited close to Cuba in conjunction with the U.S. policy of an increased Navy presence in the Caribbean.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|----------------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151 | Afghan/Iran Hostages | 10/9/79 | 472 | P6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
|-----|----------------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

In October 1979, the U.S. relationship with the Islamic Republic worsened as riots and massive demonstrations outside the American Embassy in Tehran became a common occurrence. On 9 October, a 20 October deployment of the *Midway* CVBG to the region was ordered. On 4 November, Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy and took the personnel hostage. On 20 November, the President ordered the *Kitty Hawk* CVBG into the Indian Ocean. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December reinforced the decision to maintain two CVBGs in the Indian Ocean. On April 24, an attempted rescue mission failed; eight U.S. servicemen died. On 21 January 1981, the hostages were released, after 444 days in captivity.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|----------------|----------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 152 | Park-Chung Hee | 10/26/79 | 9 | P4 | Y | 1 | N | N | | Y | Y |
|-----|----------------|----------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Following the assassination of South Korean President Park Chung Hee, DEFCON 3 was declared on 26 October 1979. The *Kitty Hawk* CVBG was ordered to a position south of Korea. On 5 November, the DEFCON alert returned to normal.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 153 | Korea | 5/27/80 | 33 | P4 | Y | 1 | N | N | Y | Y | Y |
|-----|-------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

In 1980, a growing storm of protest calling for democratic reforms led to the declaration of martial law in South Korea and the massacre of several hundred people in the town of Kwangju. A carrier moved to the area in late May, and a carrier presence was maintained through 28 June. USAF F-4Es, scheduled to be withdrawn, were directed to remain in place to maintain presence because of the political instability.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 154 | Iran-Iraq War | 9/30/80 | 125 | P6 | Y | 2 | N | N | Y | N | N |
|-----|---------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

Following the Iraqi invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980, four USAF AWACS aircraft were deployed to Saudi Arabia on 30 September. On 11 October, a reinforcement of the MIDEASTFOR was announced. In mid-October, about 60 U.S., British, French, and Australian warships were in the region to prevent potential Iranian interference with oil traffic through the Straits of Hormuz. In February 1981, a decision was made to maintain two CVBGs in the Indian Ocean even though the hostages had been released.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 155 | Poland | 12/9/80 | 24 | A5 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|--------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Because of instability along the Polish/Soviet border, the chairman of the NATO Military Committee ordered that NATO's Standing Naval Forces Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), which included one USN ship, would not be released for the Christmas holiday. At the same time, the United States decided to supply NATO with four AWACS aircraft to monitor the border situation.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 156 | Morocco | 1/29/81 | 10 | A5 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|---------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

The Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Department of Defense, decided that a well-publicized U.S. Naval visit to Agadir would be desirable to send a signal to the Soviets in response to the positioning of three Soviet Navy ships in the region. A three-day visit by CG-20 *Turner* early in February followed.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 157 | Liberia | 4/1/81 | 15 | A5 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | Y |
|-----|---------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 1 April, President Reagan ordered a company of Green Berets and a Navy destroyer to Liberia to show support for the government of Samuel K. Doe. On 10 April, the Green Berets arrived for 30 days of training exercises with Liberian troops. On 12 April, DD-988 *Thorn* arrived in Monrovia, Liberia, for a three-day port visit.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 158 | Syria | 5/3/81 | 135 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | Y | N | N |
|-----|-------|--------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

Following Israeli reprisal raids against Syrian surface-to-air missile (SAM) positions in southern Lebanon, the *Forrestal* CVBG and the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group were ordered into the Eastern Mediterranean on 3 May 1981. In mid-May, the *Independence* CVBG was retained in the Eastern Mediterranean following a transit through the Suez Canal from the Indian Ocean. On 26 May, *Independence* was released. On 14 September, the response posture for amphibious forces to conduct evacuation operations was cancelled.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 159 | Libya | 8/1/81 | 20 | A6 | Y | 2 | N | N | Y | N | N |
|-----|-------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

In response to extensive Libyan claims of sovereignty over international waters, the President authorized naval exercises in the Gulf of Sidra. During the Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations, two Libyan Air Force fighters were shot down by USN fighters on 18 August.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 160 | Sadat-Sudan | 10/7/81 | 24 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | Y | Y | N |
|-----|-------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

Following the 6 October 81 assassination of Egyptian President Sadat at a military parade, a CVBG and the MARG were ordered to a position 120 n.mi. north of Egypt. The forces were sent to the region because of the possibility of Libyan involvement in the assassination and because of fears of Libyan aggression against either Egypt or Sudan.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-----------------|----------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 161 | Central America | 10/16/81 | 47 | A3 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|-----|-----------------|----------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Amidst growing official concern over arms shipments to rebels in El Salvador, a series of maneuvers began in the Caribbean. On 23 December, DD-989 *Deyo* was tasked to sortie to the coast of El Salvador to conduct surveillance operations. On 2 February, because of the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, the Defense Mapping Agency issued Special Warning #57 warning mariners to avoid Nicaraguan harbors. On 16 February, DD-970 *Caron* completed turnover with *Deyo*, and surveillance operations were to continue in the region for the indefinite future.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 162 | Israeli Invasion | 6/8/82 | 45 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|-----|------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 6 June 1982, Israeli forces entered Lebanon in operation "Peace for Galilee." On 8 June, the Secretary of Defense ordered the MARG at Rota to the Eastern Mediterranean for potential evacuation of American citizens from Beirut. On 28 June, Israeli forces began a siege of West Beirut. On 20 July, the MARG response posture was relaxed.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 163 | Peacekeeping Force | 8/10/82 | 30 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|-----|--------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 10 August, the alert posture of the MARG was heightened in light of a likely deployment as part of a peacekeeping force to oversee the evacuation of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) forces from West Beirut. On 24 August, the first of 800 Marines began going ashore at Beirut as part of a joint U.S.-French-Italian peacekeeping force. On 8 September, following the removal of the PLO forces from West Beirut, the Marines redeployed aboard the MARG ships.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|----------------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 164 | Palestinian Massacre | 9/22/82 | 143 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|-----|----------------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 22 September 1982, following the 16 September Phalangist Christian force massacre of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps, the MARG was ordered to the Eastern Mediterranean. On 29 September, the first Marines of the Multi-National Peacekeeping Force were put ashore in Beirut. From 27 September through 21 January 1983, two carriers were tethered to Lebanon to provide support for the Marine Corps forces ashore. On 11 February, the response posture for carrier support was relaxed as the situation had stabilized.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 165 | Libya-Sudan | 2/14/83 | 11 | A6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|-------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Following Libyan threats against Sudan, the *Nimitz* CVBG moved from a position off Lebanon to a position north of Libya. USN aircraft from *Nimitz* operated in the Tripoli Flight Information Region (FIR), and the *Nimitz* closed to within 85 miles of the Libyan coast. Four USAF E-3A AWACS aircraft were deployed to Egypt as part of the increased surveillance of the region.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|----------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 166 | Honduras | 6/14/83 | 131 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | Y |
|-----|----------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In 1983, the U.S. Government expressed great concern over the safety of Honduras, citing the threat of invasion from neighboring Nicaragua. On 14 June, 100 Green Beret military advisors arrived in Honduras. On 18 July, the *Ranger* CVBG was diverted from a planned Indian Ocean deployment to the vicinity of Central America through 12 August. On 16 August, the *Coral Sea* CVBG arrived off the east coast of Nicaragua, and on 26 August, the battleship *New Jersey* arrived on station west of Nicaragua. These vessels departed the region in mid-September.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 167 | Libya-Chad | 8/1/83 | 16 | A6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | Y | N |
|-----|------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Following an escalation of the Libyan aggression against Chad, aircraft from CVN-69 *Eisenhower* operated in the Gulf of Sidra. CV-43 *Coral Sea*'s departure from the Mediterranean was delayed for a day because of uncertainty over the situation. On 6 August, two USAF E-3A AWACS and eight F-15 aircraft were dispatched to Khartoum. The aircraft were to protect the Sudanese capital from Libyan attack and support French forces if they deployed to Chad. The aircraft were withdrawn following deployment of French aircraft to Chad.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|----------------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 168 | Marine Barracks Bomb | 8/29/83 | 170 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | Y | N |
|-----|----------------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

The *Eisenhower* CVBG was ordered to return at "best speed" to the Eastern Mediterranean on 29 August as the situation in Beirut worsened, with more frequent gun battles and growing numbers of USMC casualties. On 28 August, Marines retaliated for the first time for attacks against one of their positions and on 8 September FF-1079 *Bowen* provided the first naval gunfire support (NGFS) (to silence a Druze battery shelling Beirut International Airport). On 12 September, ARG Alpha, the Pacific Amphibious Ready Group, arrived off Beirut. BB-62 *New Jersey* arrived to provide NGFS on 25 September. On 4 October, the *Eisenhower* CVBG was authorized to leave the Beirut area, and on 9 October, ARG Alpha's return to PACOM via the Suez was authorized. On 23 October 1983, a suicide bomber struck the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, killing 241. On the same day, another suicide car bomb killed 58 French paratroopers. Various Sixth Fleet units were ordered to Beirut, both to reassert the U.S. presence and to assist in rescue operations. Following the attack, the *Ranger* CVBG was diverted from port calls in Australia to the North Arabian Sea, where it operated for 122 days. On 26 February 1984, the withdrawal of the USMC contingent of the international peacekeeping force was completed.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 169 | KAL 007 | 9/1/83 | 66 | P4 | Y | 0 | N | N | | Y | N |
|-----|---------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 1 September 1983, a Soviet air defense fighter shot down Korean Air Lines flight 007 (KAL 007), killing all 267 aboard. USN surface ships were moved to the vicinity to search for debris and provide an American presence. USAF aircraft, including an F-15 squadron, provided support for the sea-air rescue (SAR) operations.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-----------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 170 | Iran-Iraq | 10/8/83 | 92 | P6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|-----|-----------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Following an 18 September 1983 Iranian threat to block oil exports from the Persian Gulf, ARG Alpha was ordered from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean on 8 October. On 10 October, the *Ranger* CVBG arrived in the northern Arabian Sea. *Ranger*, which had been scheduled to depart the region on 18 October, remained through the new year.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------------|----------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 171 | Korea-Burma | 10/11/83 | 3 | P4 | Y | 1 | N | N | | Y | N |
|-----|-------------|----------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

The *Vinson* CVBG's departure for CONUS was delayed during the U.S. Secretary of Defense's attendance at funeral ceremonies for the 21 South Korean officials killed by a North Korean bomb in Burma. The CVBG operated in waters off Pusan, South Korea, to underscore the U.S. commitment to South Korea.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|--|-----------------|----------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
| 172 | Grenada | 10/20/83 | 23 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| <p>On 19 October, in response to mounting political strife in Grenada, the JCS issued a warning order indicating the possible requirement for U.S. military assistance to evacuate U.S. citizens from the island. On 20 October, the <i>Independence</i> CVBG and the Amphibious Ready Group en route to the Mediterranean from CONUS were diverted to sail to the vicinity of Grenada to signal U.S. concern regarding events on the island. On 25 October, Marines and U.S. Army rangers landed on the island, and by 27 October, all major objectives were secured. On 4 November, <i>Independence</i> and the Amphibious Ready Group renewed their transit to the Mediterranean.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 173 | Syria | 12/3/83 | 37 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| <p>On 3 December, two F-14s flying over Lebanon were fired upon by antiaircraft artillery. On 4 December, aircraft from the aircraft carriers <i>Kennedy</i> and <i>Independence</i> were launched in a strike against antiaircraft positions; two USN planes were shot down, and one U.S. airman was taken prisoner by Syrian troops.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 174 | Central America | 3/13/84 | 264 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
| <p>In late January 1984, the Secretary of Defense authorized an increase in U.S. Navy presence operations off Central America during the period of 1 February through 31 July to demonstrate support for El Salvador during elections, deter Nicaraguan aggression, and build confidence in the U.S. commitment to Central America. On 13 March, the <i>America</i> CVBG left for operations off the east coast of Central America that coincided with Salvadoran elections on 25 March. Similar operations throughout the year included battleship, carrier, and amphibious warfare operations.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 175 | Persian Gulf | Apr-84 | 245 | A7 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| <p>Following Iraqi initiation of a major antishipping campaign, the commitment to a continuous aircraft carrier presence in the North Arabian Sea was renewed. In late May, MIDEASTFOR ships began to escort U.S. flag merchant ships because of the escalating violence in the region. On 4 June, DOD officials announced that the United States had sent AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia. (The next day, Saudi warplanes, guided by an AWACS, shot down an Iranian plane in Saudi airspace.)</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 176 | Red Sea Mines | 8/3/84 | 46 | A7 | Y | 0 | Y | N | | N | N |
| <p>On 9 July 1984, a Soviet merchant ship was struck by an unidentified explosion in the Red Sea. On 3 August, following a number of additional mine strikes and an Islamic Jihad announcement that it had laid 190 mines in the Red Sea, a small U.S. mine-countermeasures team was sent to the Red Sea. On 9 August, U.S. minesweeping operations using helicopters operating off USN ships began. In addition to the U.S. efforts, vessels from France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union conducted minesweeping operations.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|---|-----------------------|----------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
| 177 | Beirut Embassy | 9/21/84 | 42 | A6 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| <p>On 21 September, amidst renewed terrorist threats against the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, three ships were ordered off Lebanon to provide a sea-based contingency response capability. On 18 October, Sixth Fleet units in the Cyprus area were placed on alert because of a terrorist threat to the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 178 | Saudi Hijacking | 11/6/84 | 1 | A6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| <p>Following the 5 November hijacking of a Saudi airliner to Iran, the <i>Enterprise</i> CVBG was ordered to the northern Arabian Sea. On 6 November, the order was cancelled.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 179 | Cuba | 11/30/84 | 1 | A3 | Y | 1 | N | N | | Y | N |
| <p>On 30 November, <i>Nimitz</i> (CVN-68) and an escorting cruiser were ordered from Charlotte Amalie to an area just off the Cuban coast when a Navy-chartered vessel broke down and drifted into Cuban waters. The response was cancelled when the USCG ship <i>Reliance</i> took the stricken vessel under tow and removed it from Cuban waters.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 180 | U.S. Pers. in Lebanon | Mar-85 | 32 | A6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| <p>Following threats against U.S. personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, the <i>Eisenhower</i> CVBG was diverted from Majorca to the Eastern Mediterranean while U.S. personnel were evacuated by helicopter to Cyprus.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 181 | TWA 847 Hijacking | 6/14/85 | 41 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| <p>On 14 June 1985, TWA Flight 847 was hijacked to Beirut by Shiite terrorists. The <i>Nimitz</i> CVBG was ordered from Italy to the Eastern Mediterranean, along with the MARG with 1,800 Marines embarked. <i>Nimitz</i> was on station in the Eastern Mediterranean until 24 July, following the release of the passengers and aircraft.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 182 | Persian Gulf | 9/13/85 | 19 | A7 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
| <p>On 13 September 1985, COMIDEASTFOR ordered the escort of an MSC ship because of recent Iranian seizures of merchant vessels. On 22 September, two vessels were diverted from an ASW exercise with the <i>Kitty Hawk</i> CVBG to resume Persian Gulf surveillance operations.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 183 | <i>Achille Lauro</i> | 10/7/85 | 4 | A6 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | N | N |
| <p>On 7 October 1985, following the Palestinian terrorist hijacking of the Italian cruise ship <i>Achille Lauro</i>, Sixth Fleet vessels (including CV-60 <i>Saratoga</i>) moved to the Eastern Mediterranean. On 10 October, F-14s from <i>Saratoga</i> forced an Egyptian airliner with the hijackers aboard to Italy, where the hijackers were taken into custody.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 184 | Egypt Air Hijacking | 11/23/85 | 3 | A6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
| <p>On 23 November 1985, an Egyptian airliner was hijacked to Malta. USN ships, including CV-43 <i>Coral Sea</i>, responded to the hijacking and moved toward Malta for contingency purposes.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | |

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

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|-----|---------------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 185 | Persian Gulf Escort | 1/12/86 | 141 | A7 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|---------------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

The tension in the Persian Gulf persisted as the Tanker War continued unabated. The 12 January 1986 Iranian boarding of the SS *President Taylor* led to closer USN escort of U.S. merchant vessels. On 12 May, the destroyer *David R. Ray* deterred an Iranian Navy attempt to board another U.S. merchant ship.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-----------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 186 | Yemen Civil War | Jan-86 | 32 | P6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|-----------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In January 1986, amidst the bloody civil war in South Yemen, vessels from the Middle East Force, including the flagship *La Salle*, moved off the Yemeni coast for potential evacuation operations. Royal Navy vessels carried out the endangered Western nationals.

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|-----|-------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 187 | OVL-FON Ops | Feb-86 | 85 | A6 | Y | 3 | N | N | Y | N | N |
|-----|-------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

Following terrorist attacks on 27 December 1985 in the Rome and Vienna airports, a series of Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations in the Gulf of Sidra (Operations in the Vicinity of Libya, OVL) were approved. Code-named "Attain Document," the first two exercises (26-30 January and 12-15 February) occurred without incident. During "Attain Document III" (23-29 March 1986), a surface-to-air missile (SAM) site shot two SA-5 missiles at U.S. aircraft on 24 March. Over the next 16 hours, two Libyan patrol boats were sunk by USN aircraft.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|------------------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 188 | Lebanon Hostages | Mar-86 | 1 | A6 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|------------------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

A USN vessel was diverted to a point off the coast of Lebanon to stand by to pick up hostages. The vessel was soon returned to scheduled operations as no hostages were released.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-----------------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 189 | La Belle Disco, Libya | 4/10/86 | 6 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | Y | Y | N |
|-----|-----------------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

On 5 April, the La Belle Discotheque in the Federal Republic of Germany was bombed, resulting in the death of one U.S. serviceman and many injured. On 14 April, aircraft from the carriers *Coral Sea* and *America*, as well as USAF FB-111s from Lakenheath Air Force Base (AFB) in the United Kingdom, struck targets in Libya. Elements of the MARG stood off the coast, prepared to execute combat-SAR (CSAR) if necessary.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------------------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 190 | Pakistan Hijacking | Sep-86 | 1 | A6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|--------------------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Following the hijacking of a Pakistani airliner, the *Forrestal* CVBG was ordered to head toward the Eastern Mediterranean in case the aircraft took off for Larnica in Cyprus or Beirut. Because this did not occur, the vessels were soon released for normal operations.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------------------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
| 191 | Persian Gulf Ops | Jan-87 | 579 | A7 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | Y |

The U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf were perhaps the most involved use of USN forces since the Vietnam War. U.S. operations increased in intensity during 1987, as the U.S. agreed to reflag and escort a number of Kuwaiti oil tankers. Augmentation forces sent to the Persian Gulf or North Arabian Sea in 1987 included minesweeping helicopters, minesweepers, aircraft carriers, a battleship battle group, SEALs, and a contingency MAGTF. Notable points in the operations include the following: 17 May 1987, an Iraqi Exocet air-to-surface missile (ASM) hit the frigate *Stark*, killing 37 U.S. sailors; 21 July 1987, escort operations (code-named "Earnest Will") began; 24 July, the tanker *Bridgeton* struck a mine during the first "Earnest Will" transit; 21 September, U.S. forces captured an Iranian vessel laying mines; 6 October, three Iranian small boats were destroyed; 19 October, an Iranian oil-drilling platform was destroyed; 14 April 1988, FFG-58 *Roberts* struck a mine; 18 April, retaliation operations against two Iranian oil drilling platforms (one destroyed by Marines from the contingency MAGTF) led to a day-long naval battle in which many Iranian naval units were damaged or sunk; and, on 3 July 1988, in the midst of a surface engagement, CG-49 *Vincennes* shot down an Iran Air Airbus, killing all 290 passengers and crew. On 20 August 1988, a U.N.-sponsored cease-fire went into effect, ending the nearly eight-year-long war.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 192 | Hostages in Lebanon | Feb-87 | 29 | A6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|---------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In response to growing tension over hostages in Lebanon, the *Kennedy* CVBG was ordered to a MODLOC off Lebanon for potential evacuation operations.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 193 | Haiti | Jan-88 | 31 | A3 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|-----|-------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In response to increasing domestic unrest that led to a change of government, an amphibious squadron (PHIBRON) with embarked Marines was deployed off the coast of Haiti.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 194 | Panama | Apr-88 | 30 | A3 | N | 0 | N | Y | | N | N |
|-----|--------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In response to domestic unrest and increasing U.S.-Panamanian tension, U.S. forces in the Canal Zone were augmented. Marine forces sent included the Fleet Anti-Terrorist Support Team from the Marine Corps Security Force Company (FAST MCSFCO).

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-----------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 195 | Summer Olympics | Sep-88 | 31 | P4 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
|-----|-----------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

During the Summer Olympics in Seoul, South Korea, the United States deployed forces to deter a feared disruption of the Olympics by North Korea. At one point, two CVBGs (*Nimitz* and *Midway*) were operating in the Sea of Japan providing an augmented U.S. Navy presence during the Olympics.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 196 | Burma Unrest | Sep-88 | 31 | P6 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|-----|--------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

During unrest in Burma, Amphibious Ready Group ALPHA was sent to a MODLOC off Burma for possible evacuation of U.S. citizens. The endangered U.S. citizens finally left Burma by commercial air.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

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|-----|---------------|----------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 197 | Maldives Coup | 11/17/88 | 1 | P6 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|---------------|----------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

The *Nimitz* battle group was put on alert to provide a U.S. presence near the Maldives. The movement was cancelled after Indian troops sent to the island chain quickly repelled the attempted coup by an armed group of "probable" Sri Lankan Tamil mercenaries.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 198 | Lebanon Civil War | Feb-89 | 45 | A6 | Y | Y | Y | Y | | N | Y |
|-----|-------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

During February 1989, fighting in Beirut intensified. In mid-February, following the outbreak of fighting near the U.S. Embassy, the MARG was ordered to move to the Eastern Mediterranean for potential evacuation operations with the *Theodore Roosevelt* CVBG providing a covering force.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 199 | Panama Elections | 5/11/89 | 52 | A3 | Y | 1 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |
|-----|------------------|---------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Following a violent election campaign and annulment of the results by Panamanian President Noreiga, President Bush ordered a reinforcement of U.S. forces in Panama. A light infantry battalion from the U.S. Army's 7th Infantry Division and a company from the 2nd USMC division were flown to Howard Air Force Base outside Panama City. Elements of the 5th Infantry Division, Mechanized, were transported by T-AKR *Bellatrix* from Louisiana to Panama. U.S. Navy vessels alerted in support of this contingency response included the aircraft carrier *Eisenhower*.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 200 | China Civil Unrest | Jun-89 | 31 | P4 | Y | 1 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|--------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

During the demonstrations in China, and throughout the military crackdown in Beijing, a carrier battle group steamed in the South China Sea.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 201 | Hostages in Lebanon | 8/1/89 | 32 | A6 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|-----|---------------------|--------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Following the Israeli capture of Sheik Obeid and Shiite claims that Lt.Col. William R. Higgins, USMC, had been killed in Lebanon, USN forces were ordered to steam toward Lebanon and Iran. The *America* CVBG was ordered from Singapore to the Arabian Sea; the *Coral Sea* CVBG left a port call in Alexandria, Egypt, ahead of time; and BB-61 *Iowa* broke off a port call in Marseilles, France, to steam east toward Lebanon. The cruiser *Belknap*, with the Sixth Fleet commander aboard, headed to the waters off Lebanon, canceling its participation in a port call in the Soviet Union.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------------|----------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 202 | Philippines | 11/30/89 | 6 | P4 | Y | 2 | Y | Y | | Y | N |
|-----|-------------|----------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In the midst of a coup attempt against the government of Corazon Aquino, USAF F-4s based at Clark Air Force Base flew combat air patrols above rebel air bases. Press reports indicated that this was done to prevent rebel aircraft from taking off. At the same time, two aircraft carriers (*Enterprise* and *Midway*) were in the waters off the Philippines, and an ARG was moved to Subic Bay. A second ARG was ordered to halt its transit from Okinawa to Pearl Harbor and was held in the waters off Okinawa until the situation in the Philippines stabilized. Additional units alerted included elements of the U.S. Army's 25th Infantry Division (Light), which is based in Hawaii.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
|-----|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|

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|-----|--------|----------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 203 | Panama | 12/20/89 | 34 | A3 | Y | 0 | N | Y | | Y | Y |
|-----|--------|----------|----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

Following a period of growing U.S.-Panamanian tension, which greatly increased in mid-December with growing harassment of U.S. personnel stationed in the Canal Zone, U.S. forces overthrew the Noreiga regime. The primary augmentation of forces in the Canal Zone consisted of U.S. Army units, including a battalion each from the 5th and 7th Infantry Divisions and a brigade of the 82nd Airborne. In addition to extensive airlift, U.S. Air Force involvement included the first use of the Stealth fighter in a combat environment. The primary Marine Corps mission was to secure the Bridge of the Americas and to ensure the security of Howard Air Force Base. Navy involvement included a ship held in a MODLOC off the Panamanian coast. This operation included the largest special forces operations since the Vietnam War, involving more than 4,000 troops including a large number of Navy SEALs.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 204 | Liberia NEO | 5/25/90 | 230 | A5 | Y | 0 | Y | Y | | N | N |
|-----|-------------|---------|-----|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In late May 1990, following a period of increasing violence in Liberia, the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group was ordered from Toulon, France, to a holding point off Monrovia, Liberia. The first forces arrived on 2 June, with the ships of the MARG and a destroyer all on station by 4 June. The forces involved in "Operation Sharp Edge" supported the U.S. Embassy and stood by to evacuate American citizens from Liberia. The first noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) occurred on 5 August. On 21 August, the original four-ship task force was relieved by a two-ship amphibious force, which remained until November. The last amphibious ship (*Nashville*) left the coast of Liberia on 9 January 1991 to rejoin the MARG in the Mediterranean. A total of 2,609 people were evacuated from Liberia during Sharp Edge (the largest NEO since the evacuation of Saigon in 1975).

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------------------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 205 | Iraqi Pressure on Kuwait | 7/24/90 | 9 | A7 | Y | 0 | N | N | | N | N |
|-----|--------------------------|---------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

In response to mounting Iraqi pressure against Kuwait, an exercise by Middle East Force ships was ordered by the JCS. The exercise, which was a joint exercise with the United Arab Emirates, involved five MEF ships and three USAF aircraft (two tankers and one cargo plane). The forces remained in theater on higher alert during the period prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Table 6. (Continued)

| No. | Name | B-date | Length | OAC | USN | CVs | Amp | USMC | VM on CV | TAC/SAC | USA |
|-----|-------------------------|--------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|----------|---------|-----|
| 206 | Operation Desert Shield | 8/2/90 | 166 | A7 | Y | 6 | Y | Y | | Y | Y |

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. U.S. Navy forces, including the aircraft carrier *Independence* immediately began moving toward the region. On 7 August, President Bush issued orders for the movement of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia. The first U.S. Air Force and Army units began to arrive within days, and the first Marine Corps units married up with maritime prepositioning force (MPF) equipment a week later. Large numbers of U.S. Navy ships were involved in interdiction operations in support of U.N. sanctions against Iraq. Desert Shield represents the largest commitment of U.S. forces since the Vietnam War, with more than 210,000 military personnel in theater at the end of October 1990 and more than 400,000 in early January 1991. The U.S. forces in the region were joined by forces from over 20 nations around the world in support of sanctions against Iraq.

NOTE: This document was prepared in late January 1991. A decision on how to treat the conflict with Iraq in terms of this study has not been determined as of the publication of this research memorandum.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------------------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| 207 | Somalia Evacuation | 1/2/91 | 9 | P6 | 7 | 0 | Y | Y | | Y | N |
|-----|--------------------|--------|---|----|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|

On 30 December 1990, rebels from the United Somali Congress (USC) began to have great success against government troops and were threatening the capital. On 2 January 1991, USS *Guam* (LPH-9) and USS *Trenton* (LPD-14), deployed in the North Arabian Sea as part of Desert Shield, were ordered to Mogadishu to evacuate the U.S. Embassy. On the night of 4-5 January, two CH-53s from HMH-461 carried 60 Marines and SEALs 466 miles (with two refuelings en route) to the embassy, and carried 61 evacuees back to *Guam*. The next night, 10 CH-46s from HMM-263 and HMM-365 flew in to evacuate the remaining personnel. By early morning on 6 January, 281 people had been evacuated (the 282nd was born on *Guam* on 10 January) including 51 Americans, 39 Soviets, eight ambassadors, and four charge d'affaires. French and Italian Navy vessels also evacuated people from Mogadishu.

NOTES: See table 1, page 12, for notes.

SOURCES: See Selected Bibliography for partial source list.

GLOSSARY

| | |
|-------------|---|
| APD | High-Speed Transport |
| ARG | Amphibious Ready Group |
| ASW | Anti-Submarine Warfare |
| AV | Seaplane Tender |
| AWACS | Airborne Warning and Control System |
| BB | Battleship |
| BLT | Battalion Landing Team |
| CA | Cruiser |
| CG | Guided-Missile Cruiser |
| CINCLANT | Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic |
| CINCLANTFLT | Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet |
| CINCCONAD | Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense |
| CINCSAC | Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command |
| CONUS | Continental United States |
| CV | Aircraft Carrier |
| CVA | Aircraft Carrier, Attack |
| CVAN | Aircraft Carrier, Attack (nuclear-powered) |
| CVB | Large Aircraft Carrier (attack) |
| CVBG | Carrier Battle Group |
| CVL | Aircraft Carrier, Small |
| CVN | Aircraft Carrier (nuclear-powered) |
| CVS | Aircraft Carrier, Support (antisubmarine warfare) |
| DD | Destroyer |
| DEFCON | Defense Condition |
| FF | Frigate |
| FFG | Guided-Missile Frigate |
| FMFLANT | Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic |
| FON | Freedom of Navigation |
| HMH | Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron |
| HMM | Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron |
| HMR | Marine Helicopter Squadron |
| JCS | Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| LHA | Amphibious Assault Ship |
| LPH | Amphibious Assault Ship (helicopter) |
| LSD | Dock Landing Ship |
| LST | Landing Ship, Tank |
| MAB | Marine Amphibious Brigade |
| MAGTF | Marine Air Ground Task Force |
| MARG | Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group |
| MAU | Marine Amphibious Unit |
| MIDEASTFOR | Middle East Force (also MEF) |
| MEF | Marine Expeditionary Force |
| MODLOC | Modified Location |
| MRBM | Medium-Range Ballistic Missile |
| MPF | Maritime Prepositioning Force |
| MSC | Military Sealift Command |
| NEO | Non-combatant Evacuation Operation |

| | |
|---------------|---|
| OVL | Operations, Vicinity of Libya |
| PACOM | Pacific Command |
| PFLP | Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine |
| PHIBRON | Amphibious Squadron |
| PRC | People's Republic of China |
| RLT | Regimental Landing Team |
| ROC | Republic of China |
| SAC | Strategic Air Command |
| SAR | Sea-Air Rescue |
| STANAVFORLANT | Standing Naval Forces, Atlantic |
| TAC | Tactical Air Command |
| TF | Task Force |
| TG | Task Group |
| USCINCSO | U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Southern Command |
| USA | U.S. Army |
| USAF | U.S. Air Force |
| USCG | U.S. Coast Guard |
| USEUCOM | United States European Command |
| USMC | U.S. Marine Corps |
| USN | U.S. Navy |
| VM | Marine Aviation |
| VMA | Marine Attack Squadron |
| VMA(AW) | Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron |
| VMF | Marine Fighter Squadron |
| VMF(AW) | Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron |

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NOTE: This is a partial bibliography, reflecting sources that were used for multiple crises and which provided substantial information on the United States use of force (especially naval forces) during those crises. Additional sources were used for almost every individual crisis response.

APPENDIX

**USMC AIRCRAFT DEPLOYMENT
ABOARD AIRCRAFT CARRIERS**

APPENDIX: USMC AIRCRAFT DEPLOYMENT ABOARD AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

This appendix lists U.S. Marine Corps fixed-wing aircraft deployments aboard U.S. Navy aircraft carriers from 1949 through 1989. Because the sources used for this table often conflicted with each other, this should not be considered authoritative but rather as representative of the USMC squadron deployments aboard carriers. Also, this appendix understates USMC aircraft at sea deployments in two significant ways. First, deployments aboard amphibious ships are not included (this primarily excludes helicopters, but also AV-8B deployments in recent years). Second, the table only considers "attack" carriers; deployments aboard escort (CVE), light (CVL), and antisubmarine (CVS) are not included in the table. In the 1940s and 1950s, deployments aboard such carriers were possibly quite frequent. For example, during the Korean War, USMC squadrons flew ground support missions off two CVEs (VMF 214 off *Sicily*, 3 August - 15 November 1950; VMF 323 off *Badoeng Strait*, 5 August - early December 1950). This practice continued into the 1960s. For example, during the Vietnam War VMA-223 flew A-4Cs off CVS-10 *Yorktown* during one deployment (23 October 1964 - 16 May 1965).

Table A-1. USMC Aircraft Deployments Aboard Aircraft Carriers, 1949-1989

| Air Wing | Year ^a | Carrier ^b | Squadron | Aircraft Type | Notes ^c |
|----------|-------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|---------------|----------------------|
| MAG-11 | 1949 | CV-32 | MAG-11 (VMF 223, VMF 225, VMF 461) | | |
| CVG-6 | 1951 | CVB-42 | VMF 225 | | |
| CVG-4 | 1951 | CV-34 | VMF 122 | | |
| CVG-6 | 1952 | CVB-41 | VMF 225 | | |
| CVG-4 | 1952 | CVB-43 | VMA 211 | | |
| CVG-10 | 1953 | CVA-40 | VMF 114 | | |
| CVG-8 | 1953 | CVA-43 | VMF 122 | | |
| CVG-17 | 1955 | CVA-43 | VMF 122 | | |
| CVG-6 | 1955 | CVA-39 | VMA 324 | | |
| CVG-15 | 1956 | CVA-18 | VMA 223 | | |
| ATG-182 | 1957 | CVA-39 | VMF 533 | | Jordan |
| ATG-2 | 1957 | CVA-19 | VMF(AW) 214 | | PRC-ROC tension |
| CVG-1 | 1957 | CVA-42 | VMF(AW) 114 | | Syria |
| CVG-10 | 1957 | CVA-9 | VMA 225 | | |
| | 1958 | CVA-59 | VMF-333 | F-8 | Lebanon landings |
| CVG-7 | 1960 | CVA-62 | VMA 224 | | |
| CVG-15 | 1960 | CVA-43 | VMA 324, VMA 121 | | |
| CVG-10 | 1961 | CVA-38 | VMA 225 | | Dominican Republic |
| VG-2 | 1961 | CVA-41 | VMA 311 | | Laos |
| CVG-14 | 1961 | CVA-16 | VMF 323 | | Laos |
| CVG-10 | 1962 | CVA-38 | VMF 251 | | Berlin |
| CVG-7 | 1962 | CVA-62 | VMF(AW) 115 | | Cuban Missile Crisis |
| CVG-16 | 1962 | CVA-32 | VMF 232 | | |
| CVG-7 | 1963 | CVA-34 | VMA 324 | | |
| CVG-8 | 1964 | CVA-62 | VMA 331 | | |
| CVW-16 | 1965 | CVA-59 | VMF(AW) 212 | | |
| CVW-16 | 1965 | CVA-34 | VMF 212 | F-8E | Vietnam |

NOTES: See page A-3 for notes.

Table A-1. (Continued)

| Air Wing | Year ^a | Carrier ^b | Squadron | Aircraft Type | Notes ^c |
|----------|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| | 1970 | CVA-59 | VMCJ 2 | | Jordan |
| | 1970 | CVA-60 | VMCJ 2 | | Jordan |
| | 1970 | CVA-66 | VMCJ 2 | | |
| CVW-7 | 1970/1 | CVA-62 | VMA 331 | A-4E | Jordan |
| | 1971 | CVA-59 | VMCJ-2 (det) | EA-6A | |
| | 1971 | CVA-60 | VMCJ-2 (det) | EA-6A | |
| CVW-8 | 1971 | CVA-66 | VMFA 333 | | |
| CVW-15 | 1971/2 | CVA-43 | VMA(AW) 224 | A-6A, KA6D | Vietnam |
| CVW-8 | 1972/3 | CVA-66 | VMFA 333 | F4J | |
| CVW-17 | 1972/3 | CVA-59 | VMFA 531 | | |
| | 1972/3 | CVA-60 | VMCJ-2 (det) | EA-6A | |
| CVW-5 | 1972 | CV-41 | VMCJ/VMAQ 2, VMCJ/VMFP 3 (dets) | EA-6A/B, RF-4B | |
| CVW-5 | 1973 | CV-41 | VMCJ/VMAQ 2, VMCJ/VMFP 3 (dets) | | |
| CVW-5 | 1974 | CV-41 | VMCJ/VMAQ 2, VMCJ/VMFP 3 (dets) | | |
| | 1974 | CV-66 | VMCJ-2 (det) | EA-6A | |
| CVW-5 | 1975 | CV-41 | VMCJ/VMAQ 2, VMCJ/VMFP 3 (dets) | | Frequent Wind |
| | 1976/7 | CV-42 | VMA 231 (det) | | |
| CVW-5 | 1976 | CV-41 | VMCJ/VMAQ 2, VMCJ/VMFP 3 (dets) | | Korean Tree Incident |
| CVW-8 | 1976 | CVN-68 | VMFA 333 | | |
| CVW-5 | 1977 | CV-41 | VMCJ/VMAQ 2, VMCJ/VMFP 3 (dets) | | |
| CVW-5 | 1978 | CV-41 | VMCJ/VMAQ 2, VMCJ/VMFP 3 (dets) | | |
| CVW-5 | 1979 | CV-41 | VMCJ/VMAQ 2, VMCJ/VMFP 3 (dets) | | |
| CVW-14 | 1979 | CV-43 | VMFA 323, VMFA 531 | F-4N | |
| CVW-5 | 1980 | CV-41 | VMCJ/VMAQ 2, VMCJ/VMFP 3 (dets) | | Iran Hostage Crisis |
| CVW-5 | 1981 | CV-41 | VMCJ/VMAQ 2, VMCJ/VMFP 3 (dets) | | Iran Hostage Crisis |
| CVW-1 | 1981 | CV-59 | VMFA 115 | F-4J | |
| CVW-9 | 1981 | CV-64 | VMAQ 2 | EA-6B | Iran Hostage Crisis |
| CVW-8 | 1981/2 | CVN-68 | VMAQ 2 | EA-6B | Iran Hostage Crisis |
| CVW-5 | 1982 | CV-41 | VMCJ/VMFP 3 (det) | RF-4 | |
| CVW-5 | 1983 | CV-41 | VMCJ/VMFP 3 (det) | RF-4 | |
| CVW-17 | 1984 | CV-60 | VMFA (AW) 533, VMAQ 2 | A-6E, KA-6D, EA-6B | |
| CVW-22 | 1984/5 | CV-61 | VMA(AW) 121 | A-6E | |
| CVW-2 | 1986 | CV-61 | VMA(AW) 121 | A-6E | |
| CVW-13 | 1985/86 | CV-43 | VMFA 314, VMFA 323 | F/A-18 | Libya, Mar 86 |
| CVW-1 | 1986 | CV-66 | VMAQ-2 (det) | EA-6B | Libya, Mar/Apr 86 |
| CVW-3 | 1986/7 | CV-67 | VMA(AW) 533 | A-6E | |
| CVW-2 | 1986/7 | CV-61 | VMA(AW) 121 | A-6E | Earnest Will Escort |
| CVW-3 | 1988/9 | CV-67 | VMA(AW) 533 | A-6E | |
| | 1989 | CV-43 | VMFA-451 | F/A-18C | |
| | 1989 | CV-61 | VMA(AW)-121 | A-6E | |

NOTES: See page A-3 for notes.

Table A-1. (Continued)

Notes:

- a. The year column indicates when the deployment occurred. It is likely that a greater number of the deployments than indicated occurred in a period of two calendar years.
- b. The following are the carriers listed in the table, with the ship's name in addition to the hull number. The aircraft carriers are listed by their most recent designator in the appendix. For example, *Coral Sea* is listed as CV-43, rather than CVB-43 or CVA-43.

| | | |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|
| CVA-9 <i>Essex</i> | CVA-16 <i>Lexington</i> | CVA-18 <i>Wasp</i> |
| CVA-19 <i>Hancock</i> | CV-32 <i>Leyte</i> | CV-34 <i>Oriskany</i> |
| CVA-38 <i>Shangri-La</i> | CVA-39 <i>Lake Champlain</i> | CVA-40 <i>Tarawa</i> |
| CV-41 <i>Midway</i> | CVB-42 <i>FD Roosevelt</i> | CV-43 <i>Coral Sea</i> |
| CV-59 <i>Forrestal</i> | CV-60 <i>Saratoga</i> | CV-61 <i>Ranger</i> |
| CV-62 <i>Independence</i> | CV-64 <i>Constellation</i> | CV-66 <i>America</i> |
| CV-67 <i>Kennedy</i> | CVN-68 <i>Nimitz</i> | |

- c. The notes column gives some indication as to the action(s) specific carriers/deployed units were associated with. This information was derived by comparing the list of USMC deployments aboard aircraft carriers with information as to which carriers were involved in each response

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Appendix 1 from an unpublished paper by LtCol S.T. York, USMC, covers period 1949-1984 (used as primary source)

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